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"ADD ON" CLAUSES IN EQUIPMENT
PURCHASE MONEY FINANCING:
TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING
GERALD T. McLAUGHLIN*
"Our nature hardly allows us to have enough of anything without having too
much.'" **
INTRODUCTION
M ANY creditors who either lend money or extend credit on
a secured basis do so with one objective in mind-to gain
priority over competing creditors. The rules of priority under the
Uniform Commercial Code (Code),' which are straightforward in
resolving disputes between a secured and an unsecured creditor,,
become more complex when two secured creditors both claim an
interest in the same collateral. The Code normally ranks secured
creditors on a "first-in-time, first-in-right" basis.3  If one of the se-
cured creditors claims a purchase money security interest,, however,
the "first-in-time" rule of priority is reversed; a "second-in-time" pur-
chase money security interest will normally outrank a competing
"first-in-time" security interest.' Those who regularly finance the
sale of equipment may wish to rely on this "second-in-time" rule to
achieve priority. If they wish to do so, equipment lenders must de-
monstrate that their security interests are in fact purchase money
*Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
**George Savile, Character of Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury.
1. Unless otherwise noted, all citations to the Uniform Commercial Code are to
the 1978 Official Text. Except with respect to securities, the 1978 Official Text does
not vary from the 1972 Official Text.
2. Secured creditors take priority over unsecured creditors unless the unsecured
creditor has become a lien creditor. If the unsecured creditor has become a lien
creditor, only secured creditors whose security interests were perfected before the
lien attached take priority. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, -301(l)(b).
3. The Code provides that "[c]onflicting security interests rank according to
priority in time of filing or perfection." Id. § 9-312(5)(a).
4. "A security interest is a 'purchase money security interest' to the extent that
it is (a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its
price; or (b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation
gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such
value is in fact so used." Id. § 9-107.
5. Id. § 9-312(3), (4). In a dispute between two perfected purchase money in-
terests, priority is to be determined on a "first in time" basis "pursuant to subdivi-
sion (5) of section 9-312 of the Uniform Commercial Code." National Cash Register
Co. v. Mishkin's 125th St., Inc., 65 Misc. 2d 386, 389-90, 317 N.Y.S.2d 436, 440
(Civ. Ct. 1970).
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security interests. To meet this burden successfully, the language of
the security agreement is all important. The Code limits the per-
missible scope of purchase money security interests, and the language
of the security agreement must be drafted with these limits in mind.
Unfortunately, equipment lenders often include in their security
agreements "add on" or "cross collateral" clauses that may exceed
these limits. This Article examines the effects of these clauses on the
purchase money status and priority of equipment lenders.6
To understand what an "add on" clause is, a precise knowledge of
the Code's definition of a purchase money security interest is re-
quired. The Code recognizes two kinds of purchase money security
interests, the seller-buyer purchase money security interest in section
9-107(a) and the financier-buyer purchase money security interest in
section 9-107(b). 7 With respect to the section 9-107(a) seller-buyer
purchase money security interest, an equipment seller wishing to
achieve purchase money status must retain an interest in the equip-
ment sold "to secure all or part of its price."' The transaction may
be viewed as having two sides. On the collateral side, the collateral
must be the equipment sold and nothing more. On the debt side, the
debt must be all or part of the purchase price of the equipment sold
and nothing more. An "add on" clause is created when this simple
structure is altered through the addition of either more collateral than
the piece of equipment sold on the collateral side or more debt than
the price of the equipment sold on the debt side. Similarly, with
respect to the section 9-107(b) financier-buyer purchase money secur-
ity interest, the equipment financier must take a security interest in
the equipment purchased to secure the amount of money "in fact...
used"'9 for the purchase. If the financier "adds on" more collateral
than the equipment purchased or more debt than the amount in fact
used for the purchase, an "add on" arrangement is created.
6. This Article will discuss "add on" clauses only with respect to equipment
financing. Consumer and inventory financing often involve either the application of
non-Code law or specialized problems. Much of the analysis, of course, will be help-
ful with respect to "add on" clause problems in these other areas, but the purpose of
this Article is to focus the analysis on the least diffuse set of problems.
7. A third type of purchase money security interest also exists under the Code.
A seller may retain a purchase money security interest in goods sold under U.C.C. §
9-107(a). A finance company may then advance money to the seller, taking back an
assignment of the seller's chattel paper as security for the advance. The finance com-
pany would thus inherit the seller's purchase money status. Id. § 9-107, Official
Comment 1. See also id. § 9-302(2) & Official Comments to this section. Because the
finance company's purchase money status is derived from the seller's § 9-107(a)
purchase money status, this type of purchase money security interest is treated as a
variant of the seller-buyer purchase money security interest.
8. Id. § 9-107(a).
9. Id. § 9-107(b).
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With few exceptions, courts have treated "add on" arrangements
harshly. 0 They have reasoned that if a secured creditor wishes to
avail himself of the benefits of purchase money status, he has the
burden of following the explicit instructions of section 9-107." De-
viation from these instructions will result in denial of purchase money
status and the benefits of this status. 12 In some jurisdictions, the
mere presence of "add on" language in a security agreement destroys
the purchase money character of a transaction.' 3 Without a valid
purchase money security interest, the equipment lender cannot claim
priority over "first-in-time" creditors. Even when the courts adopt a
more lenient attitude towards "add on" clauses," their presence may
still result in a loss of purchase money priority if the equipment len-
der fails to demonstrate which portion of the debt is purchase money
debt. 1
The use of "add on" clauses poses serious risks for the equipment
lender and justifies a detailed treatment of the subject. To simplify
the analysis, "add on" clauses will be divided into three general cate-
gories: (1) "debt add on" clauses, in which, on the debt side of the
transaction, more debt is added than the price of the equipment sold,
(2) "collateral add on" clauses, in which, on the collateral side of the
transaction, more collateral is added than the equipment sold, and (3)
"debt collateral add on" clauses, in which, on both sides of the trans-
action, more debt and more collateral are added. Part I of this Article
will analyze the use of these "add on" clauses by section 9-107(a)
purchase money sellers of equipment. It will be shown that the Code
sanctions the use of certain "debt add on" clauses if the debt added is
related either to the sale of equipment or to the preservation of the
equipment as collateral. The Code adopts a less liberal attitude to-
wards "collateral add on" clauses, however, permitting only "pro-
ceeds" of the equipment to be added on as additional purchase
money collateral. The consequences of including either an imper-
missible "debt add on" clause or an impermissible "collateral add on"
clause in the security agreement will be discussed with the sugges-
10. See Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce (In re Manuel), 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir.
1975); W.S. Badcock Corp. v. Banks (In re Norrell), 426 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Ga.
1977); In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 243 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
11. In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 243, 248 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
12. The benefits of purchase money status include not only a priority advantage,
but also automatic perfection without the need for filing for certain types of collat-
eral. U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d) (automatic perfection for consumer goods). Deprivation of
purchase money status would mean that "there was no automatic perfection." In re
Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 243, 248 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
13. See In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 243, 248 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
14. See Kawasho Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Alper (In re Mid-Atlantic Flange Co.), 26
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 203, 208 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
15. See notes 89-92 infra and accompanying text.
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tion that, despite some opposing case law, impermissible "add on"
clauses should not entirely destroy an equipment seller's purchase
money status. Finally, Part I will analyze "debt collateral add on"
clauses, demonstrating that, although complex in form, this type of
"add on" clause is essentially a combination of an impermissible "debt
add on" clause and an impermissible "collateral add on" clause. If
viewed in this fashion, its use should not necessarily result in an
equipment seller's total loss of purchase money status, but should
require that his purchase money status be carefully tailored so as to
be kept within acceptable limits.. It will be suggested, however, that
the potential benefits of using "debt collateral add on" clauses do not
outweigh the risk that a court may not perform the tailoring neces-
sary to save the equipment seller's purchase money status. In Part II
of this Article, the analysis will be extended to the section 9-107(b)
purchase money financier of equipment. When the conclusions
reached in Part I with respect to the seller of equipment equally
apply to the financier of equipment, the analysis will not be re-
peated. In certain situations, however, the specific language of sec-
tion 9-107(b) will require that these conclusions be modified or qual-
ffied. Only these situations will be discussed.
I. THE PURCHASE MONEY SELLER OF EQUIPMENT
A. "Debt Add On" Clauses
Creditor X has a perfected security interest in debtor B's existing
equipment and after-acquired equipment." B requires a new com-
puter for his monthly billings and decides to buy one from equipment
seller S. In the security agreement, S retains an interest in the com-
puter to secure the outstanding balance due on its purchase price.
Under section 9-107(a) of the Code, S has a purchase money security
interest in the computer, and if he files within prescribed time limits,
he will also have priority in the computer over creditor X. 17 S,
however, might either consciously or unconsciously include a "debt
add on" clause in the security agreement by retaining an interest in
the computer to secure something more than the balance due on the
price. This "debt add on" clause might be drafted in one of five ways.
16. U.C.C. § 9-204(1) states that "a security agreement may provide that any or
all obligations covered by the security agreement are to be secured by after-acquired
collateral."
17. A purchase money security interest in equipment is perfected by filing. See
id. § 9-302. It has "priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral
[ . . if] perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral or
within ten days thereafter." Id. § 9-312(4).
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1. "Debt Add On" Clauses-Amounts Expended at
the Time of Sale for Charges Related to the Sale
At the time of purchase, an equipment seller normally adds certain
sales related charges to the list price of the computer. These may
include one or more of the following items: sales taxes; incidental
charges for services provided by the seller, such as charges for deliv-
ery and installation of the computer or for extended warranty cover-
age; finance charges; insurance costs, such as the cost of credit life or
health and accident insurance or the cost of insurance against loss or
damage to the computer; and Code filing fees. If in the security
agreement the equipment seller retains an interest in the equipment
to secure not only its list price but also one or more of these addi-
tional charges, would a "debt add on" problem be created? The court
in Kawasho International (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Alper (In re Mid-Atlantic
Flange Co.) 8 seemed to say "yes." In distinguishing a group of prior
cases involving "add on" clauses, the court in Kawasho suggested that
in one of these cases a seller did create an "add on" clause by retain-
ing an interest in the collateral sold to secure its list price and attend-
ant finance charges.19 If the addition of finance charges to list price
constitutes an "add on" clause, it may be logically assumed that the
addition of other sales related charges to list price would similarly
constitute an "add on" clause, thus placing the purchase money na-
ture of the security interest in jeopardy. If the term "price" in section
9-107(a) is interpreted as "list price," the Kawasho view is correct.
The addition of a further charge to the list price would necessarily
result in a "debt add on" clause. If, however, the term "price" in
section 9-107(a) is defined more broadly as "credit price," no "debt
add on" problem arises. The term "credit price" normally includes
the list price, other additional charges paid by a cash buyer of the
item, such as sales taxes and the cost of delivery and installation, and
other charges paid by a credit buyer, such as the finance charge,
insurance premiums, and filing fees. Therefore, if "price" means
"credit price," and "credit price" already includes all of these addi-
tional cash and credit charges, by retaining an interest in the equip-
ment to secure any of these amounts, the equipment seller would not
be adding on anything to the equipment "price." This interpretation
of "price" in section 9-107(a) as "credit price" is supported by the text
of the Code, by purchase money policy considerations, and finally, by
pre-Code law.
a. Definition of Price in Section 9-107(a)
The drafters of the Code did not define the term "price" either in
section 9-107 or in the definitional sections of Articles 1 or 9. Simi-
18. 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 203 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
19. Id. at 208.
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larly, no precise definition is indicated in the Official Comments to sec-
tion 9-107. Consequently, the meaning of the term must be gleaned
from evidence contained elsewhere in Article 9. Sections 9-505(1) and
9-507(1), in treating consumer credit security interests, explicitly use
the term "cash price" instead of "price."2 The use of the modifier
"cash" with "price" indicates that the term "price" alone has a broad-
er scope than the term "cash price." If "price" includes "cash price"
plus "something more," it is necessary, first, to define the core con-
cept of "cash price," and, second, to define the boundaries of the
"something more.
A reasonable reading of the term "cash price" should encompass
those charges routinely present in an all cash sale uncomplicated by
financing. Because sales taxes are mandated by governmental author-
ity and because delivery, installation, or extended warranty charges
would exist whether or not the sale were financed, the term "cash
price" could easily be read to include these items. Arguments drawn
from the area of consumer finance buttress this interpretation. First,
when used in consumer finance, the term "cash price" typically in-
cludes sales taxes and sales related charges for delivery and
installation.2" Second, if sales taxes and these other charges were not
included in "cash price," there would be a disparity in the amount of
the section 9-507(1.) consumer penalty depending on whether the
transaction were a purchase money sale under section 9-107(a) or a
purchase money loan under section 9-107(b). Assume that the pur-
chase price of consumer goods is $100, the sales tax is $8, and the
delivery cost is $12. If, under section 9-107(b), a financier advances
the money to purchase the consumer goods, the seller would neces-
sarily collect the sales tax and charge the delivery costs. The principal
amount of the advance would have to be $120 to cover these costs. If
a penalty is then imposed upon the financier for some violation of
Article 9, section 9-507(1) requires that the penalty be 10% of the
"principal amount of the debt" or $12, plus the credit service charge.
If, however, under section 9-107(a), a seller sells the same goods on
credit and the section 9-507(1) penalty is imposed on him, the pen-
alty must be 10% of the "cash price" plus the time price differential.
If the sales tax and delivery charges are not included in the cash
20. Both sections are concerned with consumer financing. U.C.C. § 9-505(1)
deals with the right to strict foreclosure on consumer collateral, and § 9-507(1) deals
with the computation of the penalty for violation of Article 9 with respect to consum-
er debtors.
21. See Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 1.301(9) (1974), reprinted in 2 J. Fon-
seca, Handling Consumer Credit Cases § 17:2, at 46 (2d ed. 1980). Although the
definition of "cash price" does not specifically list a charge for extended warranty
coverage, it would be included within the definition because it is a service "related
to the sale." Id., reprinted in 2 J. Fonseca, Handling Consumer Credit Cases § 17:2,




price, the penalty would be only $10 plus the time price differential
instead of $12 plus the time price differential. Parity between the
penalty imposed on a purchase money seller and a purchase money
financier requires that the "cash price" include, at a minimum, sales
taxes and charges for services provided by the seller, such as delivery
and installation costs and the cost of extended warranty coverage.'
Even if "cash price" is read to include amounts paid in every cash
sale, the term cannot be read to include costs involved only in credit
sales. These amounts, however, including first, the finance charge,
and second, the filing fees and costs of insurance, may be subsumed
under a reasonable reading of the "something more" included in the
broader definition of price in section 9-107(a).
i. The Finance Charge
The credit price of an item always exceeds its cash price, and the
difference is referred to as the "time price differential." 2 A purchase
money seller routinely retains an interest in collateral to secure both
the cash price and this added "time price differential," naturally
assuming that his purchase money security interest includes both
amounts. In light of this routine practice, if the drafters of the Code
had intended to restrict purchase money debt to the cash price alone,
one would have expected Article 9 to contain a clear and unambig-
uous statement to this effect. There is no such statement in the Arti-
cle. Furthermore, section 9-507(1) seems to imply the opposite.
Under this section, both the cash price and the "time price differen-
tial" must be considered in the calculation of the statutory penalty
imposed on sellers of consumer goods who violate the provisions of
Article 9.11 Most credit sellers of consumer goods are purchase
money sellers, who normally retain an interest in collateral to secure
the cash price of goods and the time price differential. When section
9-507(1) directs that both these amounts be used to compute the
penalty, there is the strong inference that purchase money debt in-
cludes, at a minimum, the cash price and the time price differential.
If this is a fair inference from section 9-507(1), then the term "price"
22. This same line of reasoning with respect to U.C.C. § 9-507(1) has been ap-
plied to the question of down payments in the calculation of consumer penalties. J.
White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code
§ 26-14, at 1126 n.160 (2d ed. 1980).
23. The time price differential is not limited by state usury laws. Hogg v. Ruff-
ner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115, 119 (1861); Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of Am., 17 Utah
2d 114, 119, 405 P.2d 339, 342 (1965); Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1077 & n.16
(1967).
24. U.C.C. § 9-507(1).
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in section 9-107(a) should be construed broadly to include the cash
price and the "time price differential," that is, the finance charge. 3
ii. Insurance Premiums and Filing Fees
As a condition for the extension of credit, an equipment seller cus-
tomarily requires the purchase of insurance against loss or damage to
the collateral. Less commonly, he might prefer credit life or health
and accident insurance to guarantee a fund from which the debt can
be repaid. If the buyer does not pay the necessary insurance pre-
mium directly, the equipment seller may pay the premium and add
the cost to the debt secured by the collateral. Similarly, the equip-
ment seller must file a financing statement to perfect his security
interest.2" Because, this filing fee is minimal,27 the buyer may pay
the fee to the seller at the time of sale.28 If the payment is not
made, the seller may add this cost to the secured debt. Including
these additional charges for insurance and filing 29 in the "price" of
the equipment for the purposes of section 9-107(a) may be challanged
as a form of "debt add on" clause.
From the perspective of the equipment seller, these costs are an
integral part of a credit sale and, therefore, logically includable in the
"price." If the buyer does not pay these costs, the equipment seller
will routinely add them to the debt secured by the collateral.
Theoretically, of course, this secured debt is divisible into discrete
components: list price, cost of delivery, the finance charge, the insur-
ance premium, and the filing fee. But because all these costs were
incurred at the time of the sale and all directly facilitated the sale,
the equipment seller would scoff at such "metaphysics." Acknowledg-
ing this pragmatic approach, section 1-102(1) states that the Code
25. It should be recognized, however, that in the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code the term "finance charges" does include certain amounts beyond the "time
price differential." Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 1.301(20)(a)(ii)(iv) (1974), re-
printed in 2 J. Fonseca, Handling Consumer Credit Cases § 17:2, at 49-50 (2d ed.
1980). For the sake of convenience, however, the term "finance charge" will be used
as the equivalent of the term "time price differential."
26. A purchase money security interest in equipment is not automatically per-
fected. See U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d).
27. In New York, for example, the filing fee is normally $2. N.Y. U.C.C. §
9-403(5) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
28. For a form of consumer retail installment contract in which the filing fees are
required to be paid at the time of the execution of the contract, see L. Denonn,
Secured Transactions Under the UCC 267-68 (1970).
29. In the context of consumer financing, these charges are called "additional
charges" and are excluded from the definition of finance charges and the time price
differential. See Uniform Consumer Credit Code §§ 1.301(20)(b)(ii), 2.501(1)(a), (b),
(2)(a), (b), reprinted in 2 J. Fonseca, Handling Consumer Credit Cases § 17:2, at
49-50, 84-85 (2d ed. 1980).
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"should be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes and policies." 10 One of these policies is "to simplif,, clarify
and modernize the law governing commercial transactions";" another
is "to permit the continued expansion of commerical practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties." '  Including in
the "price" of an item sold all credit costs that were incurred at the
time of sale and directly facilitated the sale would further both of
these policies. It is the simplest solution and the solution that com-
ports most readily with general business practice and understanding.
Therefore, unless Article 9 contains strong evidence to the contrary,
the term "price" in section 9-107(a) should be defined to encompass
all incidental credit costs incurred at the time of the sale, including
the finance charge, the insurance premium, and the filing fee.
Unfortunately, Article 9 is ambivalent on the question whether fil-
ing fees and insurance premiums are included in the section 9-107(a)
term "price." On the one hand, section 9-306(1) seems to support at
least the inclusion of insurance premiums in the "price" of an item.3
It provides that any insurance benefits payable by reason of loss of or
damage to the collateral normally constitute "proceeds." As will be
shown in the subsequent analysis, the "proceeds" of equipment can
be included in purchase money collateral along with the original
equipment. If purchase money collateral includes both the original
equipment and its "proceeds," the "price" of the purchase money
collateral should be interpreted to include both the price of the ori-
ginal equipment and the price of the "proceeds." The price of the
"proceeds" in this case is the insurance premium. On the other hand,
section 9-507(1) supports an argument against the inclusion of insur-
ance and filing costs in the section 9-107(a) definition of "price." If
these costs constituted part of the "price," why are they omitted from
the computation of the statutory penalty imposed on purchase money
sellers of consumer goods? The penalty is based on the the cash price
and the "time price differential," and the standard definition of the
"time price differential" does not include insurance and filing costs.
There is a plausible, although not totally convincing, explanation for
the omission. The debt secured in most sales of consumer goods will
be small, and consequently, the seller may not require insurance
against loss or damage to the collateral. As for the filing fee, in a
purchase money sale of consumer goods, the seller normally does not
30. U.C.C. § 1-102(1).
31. Id. § 1-102(2)(a).
32. Id. § 1-102(2)(b).
33. Id. § 9-306(1) (definition of proceeds).
34. See notes 106-11 infra and accompanying text.
35. U.C.C. § 9-507(1).
36. See note 29 supra.
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need to file a financing statement to perfect his security interest.3'
Consequently, in the typical sale of consumer goods, there will be no
filing fee. As a result, the drafters of the Code may have decided to
base the penalty only on those amounts always present in a consumer
sale,- rather than on amounts that may or may not be present. In
light of Article 9's obvious ambivalence, the simplest, most practical
solution is to include in the "price" of the equipment sold any insur-
ance premiums or filing costs incurred at the time of the sale.
In progressive steps, it has been shown that the section 9-107(a)
definition of "price" includes the cash price, the finance charge, and
other incidental credit costs incurred at the time of the sale. Thus,
"price" should be broadly defined as "credit price."
b. The Policy Behind Purchase
Money Priority
Broadly defining "price" as "credit price" is further supported by
the Code's policy of entitling purchase money lenders to priority over
competing secured creditors.Y The purchase money priority rule en-
courages the acquisition of new assets by the debtor. Assume B com-
pletely mortgages his existing equipment and after-acquired equip-
ment to creditor X. Wishing to purchase a new computer, B may
approach creditor X for an additional loan. If creditor X refuses, B
must approach equipment seller S and ask if lie will sell the compu-
ter on time. Without a purchase money priority rule, S will realize
that if he sells the computer to B on credit, he would take a second
interest in the computer because creditor X already has the first in-
terest under his after-acquired property clause.4" Thus, S may be
discouraged from making the sale. The priority given by the Code to
purchase money sellers, however, permits seller S to take the first
interest in the computer." It is illogical for the Code, on the one
hand, to encourage the making of the sale by entitling the seller to
purchase money priority, but on the other hand, not to permit the
purchase money priority to include all sales related charges. The
seller must add the sales tax and the cost of installation to the list
price of any equipment sold. Similarly, the seller will charge the
debtor all the costs of financing the sale. If the seller is not given pur-
chase money priority in the equipment to secure all of these amounts,
37. In most instances a "purchase money security interest in consumer goods"
can be perfected without filing. U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d).
38. These amounts are the "time price differential" and the "cash price." Id. §
9-507(1).
39. The Code priority rules for competing security interests are set out in id. §
9-312(3), (4).
40. Id. §§ 9-204(1), -312(5), (6).
41. Id. § 9-312(4).
670 [Vol. 49
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the sale will be discouraged rather than encouraged, and the Code
policy of purchase money priority will be undermined.
c. Pre-Code Law
Pre-Code law, both common and statutory, provides additional
support for reading "price" in section 9-107(a) as "credit price." These
pre-Code analogies, however, must be cautiously applied because
they frequently may prove too much.
Under the common law of conditional sales, the lineal ancestor of
seller-buyer purchase money security interests, ' expenses connected
with or incidental to the sale could be included in the secured obliga-
tion without transforming a conditional sale into a chattel mortgage. 13
Although the majority rule permitted even debts unrelated to the
sale to be secured by the item sold," both the majority and the
minority views agreed that, at a minimum, the inclusion of incidental
sales costs within the amount of the debt secured did not destroy a
conditional sale. 45
Similarly, the Uniform Conditional Sales Act included amounts in-
cidental to the sale in the secured obligation." The Uniform Con-
ditional Sales Act defined a conditional sale as "any, contract for the
sale of goods under which possession is delivered to the buyer and
the property in the goods is to vest in the buyer at a subsequent time
upon the payment of part or all of the price, or upon the performance
of any other condition."4 In construing this language, the court in
42. A conditional sale may be strictly defined as "a purchase money security
transaction, subject in most states to statute, in which title to the goods was retained
by the seller or his assignee until the full purchase price had been paid, usually in
periodic installments. . .. Many types of 'conditions" may be attached to the sale of
goods." 1 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 3.7, at 81 (1965).
43. See Braden v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. (In re Halferty), 136 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir.
1943); Cloud Oak Flooring Co. v. J.A. Riggs Tractor Co., 223 Ark. 447, 449, 266
S.W.2d 284, 286 (1954); Annot., 148 A.L.R. 346 (1944). For a thorough discussion of
the chattel mortgage, see 1 G. Gilmore, supra note 42, §§ 2.1, 2.2, at 24-27.
44. See Braden v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. (In re Halferty), 136 F.2d 640, 641-42 (7th
Cir. 1943) (subsequent indebtedness); Southern Hardwvare & Supply Co. v. Clark,
201 F. 1, 2-3 (5th Cir. 1912) (same); In re C.J. Gelatt & Son, 24 F.2d 215, 215
(M.D. Pa. 1928) (same); Cloud Oak Flooring Co. v. J.A. Riggs Tractor Co., 223 Ark.
447, 449, 266 S.W.2d 284, 286 (1954) (equipment repair); Annot., 148 A.L.R. 346,
350-53 (1944). In contrast, some courts have held that the indebtedness must be
related to the sale. See Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Casey, 61 F.2d 473, 474 (3d Cir. 1932);
Ittleson v. Hagan, 245 Mich. 56, 57, 222 N.W. 145, 145 (1928); 1 G. Gilmore, supra
note 42, § 3.3, at 71.
45. See 1 G. Gilmore, supra note 42, § 3.3, at 71.
46. Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 1, reprinted in I. Mariash, A Treatise on the
Law of Sales, app. C, at 808 (1930); see Glenn, The Conditional Sale at Common
Law and as a Statutory Security, 25 Va. L. Rev. 559, 573 (1939).
47. Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 1, reprinted in I. Mariash, A Treatise on the
Law of Sales, app. C., at 808 (1930). See also Uniform Sales Act § 20. The Uniform
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Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Casey ruled that amounts beyond the purchase
price that were incidental to the sale could be validly secured by the
conditional sale contract.4
Pre-Code common law and statutory analogies clearly support an
expansive reading of conditional sale debt and thus, indirectly, an
expansive reading of "price" in section 9-107(a). A degree of caution
and discrimination, however, is necessary in the application of these
analogies. According to the majority view, conditional sale debt, un-
like Code purchase money debt, could include debt totally unrelated
to the sale transaction. 9 Because conditional sale debt was so broad-
ly defined, one does not find in these pre-Code cases a precise analy-
sis of which costs are included in the purchase price and which costs
are not. Courts that adopted the minority view, however, did limit
conditional sale debt to the purchase price and costs incidental to the
sale.' This position is more consonant with the language of section
9-107(a). But even courts that applied this more restrictive definition
of conditional sale debt may have been unconsciously influenced by
the majority view. Certain costs that were not truly incidental to the
sale were occasionally found to be within the scope of conditional sale
debt."' Furthermore, the policy questions at issue in the pre-Code
cases were often quite different from those presented by Code pur-
chase money priority cases. After-acquired property clauses were not
widely recognized before the adoption of the Code.52 Consequently,
pre-Code courts rarely confronted a priority dispute that pitted a con-
ditional vendor of collateral against an earlier creditor who had bar-
gained for an interest in the same collateral. A typical pre-Code dis-
pute involved a conditional vendor against a trustee in bankruptcy,
Sales Act permitted the seller to reserve the right to possession until "certain condi-
tions" were fulfilled. In construing this language, the court in Braden v. Bucyrus-
Erie Co. (In re Halferty), 136 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1943), stated that "[ilt is clear from
this language that the seller may impose as many conditions as he desires. He is not
confined solely to the condition of payment of the purchase price, nor in fact at all
unless the contract so states, for that condition is not specifically mentioned in the
section." Id. at 644.
48. 61 F.2d 473, 474 (3d Cir. 1932). The Bucyrus court, of course, read the
Conditional Sales Act quite narrowly. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
49. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
50. See Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Casey, 61 F.2d 473 (3d Cir. 1932); Ittleson v.
Hagan, 245 Mich. 56, 222 N.W. 145 (1928); 1 G. Gilmore, supra note 42, § 3.3, at
71; Annot., 148 A.L.R. 346, 348 (1944).
51. In Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Casey, 61 F.2d 473 (3d Cir. 1932), the court included
the cost of repairs as part of the conditional sale debt. Id. at 474, Professor Gilmore
suggests that the Bucyrus court may have gone beyond its own logic by including
these unrelated costs within the scope of the conditional sale debt. See 1 G. Gil-
more, supra note 42, § 3.3, at 71.
52. U.C.C. § 9-204, Official Comment 2.
[Vol. 49
"ADD ON" CLAUSES
the representative of the unsecured creditors.-" These unsecured
creditors had not bargained for an interest in the collateral, which
now the trustee as their representative claims from the conditional
vendor. In this situation, to favor the conditional vendor, a court may
have been more willing to permit a certain latitude in the definition
of conditional sale debt. But in a dispute between two secured credi-
tors when both had bargained for an interest in the same collateral, a
court might have demonstrated less partiality to the conditional ven-
dor. If these priority disputes had been regularly presented, the pre-
Code scope of conditional sale debt might have been significantly nar-
rowed. Therefore, the broad reading of conditional sale debt in the
pre-Code context may not be a totally persuasive argument for an
equally broad reading of the purchase money "price" in the modem
Code context.
2. "Debt Add On" Clauses-Post Sale Amounts Expended to
Preserve the Value of the Collateral or to
Protect the Equipment Seller's Interest in
the Collateral
Assume creditor X has a perfected security interest in B's equip-
ment and after-acquired equipment. Subsequently, equipment seller
S sells a computer to B on time and retains an interest in the compu-
ter to secure the outstanding balance due on its price and any future
amounts that S may spend either to preserve its value or to protect
his interest in the computer. The security agreement, however, clear-
ly provides that B has the responsibility to pay all taxes and insurance
premiums and to keep the computer free of any liens. Unfortunately,
soon after S perfects his security interest, B fails to pay personal
property taxes due on the computer, fails to make a required pay-
ment necessary to keep the computer insured against damage, and
permits an artisan's lien to attach to the computer. To preserve the
value of the computer as collateral, S pays these expenses. If B then
defaults in his loan payments to both X and S, would S's purchase
money priority in the computer cover these additional payments?
Clearly, these post-sale payments cannot be considered part of the
"price" of the computer. Although these payments are technically
"add ons" to the price, the Code nonetheless permits their inclusion
in purchase money debt. Therefore, without affecting his purchase
money priority, an equipment seller may retain an interest in the
equipment to secure not only its price but also any additional ex-
penses incurred either to preserve its value or to protect his interest
53. Braden v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. (In re Halferty), 136 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1943);
Peter Smith & Sons Grocery Co. v. Daily (In re Ames), 289 F. 208 (6th Cir. 1923);
Southern Hardware & Supply Co. v. Clark, 201 F. 1 (5th Cir. 1912).
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in it. To demonstrate how the Code sanctions the use of this form of
"debt add on" clause, section 9-207 must be considered.
a. Section 9-207 of the Code
Section 9-207(2) provides that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, when
collateral is in the secured party's possession," reasonable expenses
incurred in the preservation of the collateral become part of the debt
secured by the collateral.5 1 It is important to note that these ex-
penses automatically become part of the secured debt unless the
security agreement specifically states othenvise. Section 9-207(2),
however, includes these expenses in secured debt only when the se-
cured party is in physical possession of the collateral, which is rare in
the normal sale of equipment. But there is no reason to assume that
the drafters intended to include these payments in secured debt
when the secured party was in possession, but not include them in
secured debt when the secured party was not in possession. Professor
Gilmore, one of the drafters of Article 9, observes that
[c]ustomarily security agreements provide that the debtor shall in
the first instance pay the insurance premiums and the taxes and
that, if he does not do so, the secured party may pay them and
add the payments so made to the secured obligation. Even in the
absence of an express term in the agreement, there is no reason to
doubt that the secured party could so act to protect his interest in
the collateral. Provided that advances made, directly or indirectly,
are covered by the security agreement, they will be included in
the secured obligation.m
If these payments to preserve either the value of the collateral or
the secured party's interest in the collateral automatically become
part of the secured debt, it must be determined whether they also
automatically become part of purchase money debt. Two alternate
views are possible. First, although these payments do become part of
the secured debt, the secured debt must be subdivided into two
components: the purchase money component-the price of the
equipment-and the non-purchase money component-the amount
of these payments "added on" to the equipment price. Second, be-
cause the Code automatically includes these payments in secured
debt, these payments should automatically assume the character of
the secured debt. If the secured debt is purchase money debt, these
54. The Code specifically includes under "reasonable expenses . . . incurred in
the custody, preservation, use or operation of the collateral . . . chargeable to the
debtor and . . . secured by the collateral" amounts paid for insurance and taxes.
U.C.C. § 9-207(2)(a).
55. Id.
56. 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 42, § 43.5, at 1199 (footnote omitted).
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payments should become part of that purchase money debt. Policy
arguments support the adoption of this latter view.
b. The Policy Behind Purchase Money Priority
By preferring purchase money sellers of equipment over other se-
cured creditors with after-acquired property interests, the Code seeks
to encourage sales of needed equipment to buyers.Y Including in
purchase money debt payments either to preserve the value of col-
lateral or to protect the seller's interest in the collateral furthers this
policy. These costs, like the finance charge and the costs of filing, are
directly incidental to a secured transaction. Unless the equipment
seller knows that he can subsequently expend money to protect the
value of the collateral without sacrificing his priority rights, he will be
less willing to enter into the sale. All payments that directly facilitate
the credit aspects of the transaction, whether paid at the time of the
sale or subsequent to the sale, should be included in purchase money
debt.
c. Pre-Code Law
In construing the common law of conditional sales, the court in
Peter Smith & Sons Grocery Co. v. Daily (In re Ames)," found that a
clause that added to the purchase price of the goods the cost of
"'taxes, insurance, or other costs or charges necessary to protect or
preserve the property" did not destroy the conditional sale nature of
the transaction.5 9 The most helpful pre-Code analogy, however, is
not one drawn from the law of conditional sales, but rather one
drawn from the law of future advances. Under the common law, a
lender who advanced money on a secured basis received priority in
the collateral for the amount actually loaned.6 If voluntary advances
were made at a later point in time, some courts held that the priority
of these future voluntary advances did not "relate back" to the prior-
ity of the first loan.6 The two advances were treated as separate
transactions, and the lender did not have priority for the voluntary
advance over parties whose security interests or liens arose between
the first loan and this later voluntary advance.- Amounts expended
after the loan for taxes, insurance premiums, and the like, however,
were not future voluntary advances, although they could reasonably
57. See U.C.C. § 9-312(4); notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
58. 289 F. 208 (6th Cir. 1923).
59. Id. at 209-11 & n.1.
60. On the question of the common law of future advances, see 2 C. Gilmore,
supra note 42, § 35.4.
61. Id. § 35.4, at 927.
62. Id. § 35.4. at 928.
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be so classified.6 These expenses were considered so essential and
so closely related to the protection of the secured party that they
merited the same priority status as the initial loan itself.'
The Code, policy considerations, and pre-Code case law support
the notion that payments to preserve the value of the collateral or to
protect the equipment seller's interest in the collateral should be
treated as purchase money debt. In essence, although these expenses
do not constitute part of the "price" of equipment sold, they are still
includable within the seller's purchase money priority. Under the
Code, a clause in the security agreement that adds these expenses to
the "price" and includes both amounts in the secured debt is thus a
permissible form of "debt add on" clause.
3. "Debt Add On" Clauses-Post Sale Amounts
Expended to Collect the Secured Debt
The security agreement may provide that the seller retains an in-
terest in the equipment to secure the outstanding balance due on its
price and any expenses that he may incur at some future time to
collect the secured debt. The two primary types of these expenses
are repossession costs and any attorney's fees incurred to collect the
debt. Although it does not technically include these expenses in
purchase money debt, for all practical purposes, the Code treats
them as if they were part of purchase money debt.
a. Section 9-504
Section 9-504 controls the disposition of the proceeds when col-
lateral has been repossessed and sold. The proceeds are distributed
first to pay expenses of repossession and reasonable attorney's feesto
and only second to discharge the indebtedness secured.6 By listing
attorney's fees and expenses of repossession separately, the section
makes it clear that they are not included in the secured debt. 7 Con-
sequently, it is impossible to include these payments as a part of the
secured debt-and thus part of the purchase money debt-as was
done with payments to preserve the value of the collateral discussed
in the immediately preceding section.'
63. Id. § 35.4, at 929.
64. Id.
65. U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(a). Unlike the expenses of repossession, the payment of
reasonable attorney's fees must be provided for in the security agreement.
66. Id. § 9-504(1)(b).
67. But see Wilson Leasing Co. v. Seaway Pharmacal Corp., 53 Mich. App. 359,
220 N.W.2d 83 (1974). The court held that "when [the] contract provides for reason-
able attorneys' fees pursuant to UCC 9-504(1) (a), the amount of the attorneys' fees Is
an element of the principal debt." Id. at 367, 220 N.W.2d at 87 (footnote omitted).
68. See notes 54-65 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 49
"ADD ON" CLAUSES
The question whether they are actually included in purchase
money debt, however, is immaterial because section 9-504 treats
these payments more favorably than the purchase money debt.- If
purchase money collateral is repossessed, the proceeds of any sale
must be used to repay the expenses of repossession and attorney's
fees before the purchase money debt itself is repaid. The obvious
syllogism emerges:
(1) Because he has priority, a purchase money seller of equip-
ment must be repaid the price of the equipment before payment
to other secured creditors with an interest in the same equipment.
(2) But the Code requires that the purchase money seller be
repaid the expenses of repossessing the equipment and attorney's
fees before being repaid the price of the equipment.
(3) Therefore, the Code gives the purchase money seller priority
over other creditors for the expenses of repossession and attorney's
fees as well as for the price of the equipment.
Thus, the expenses of repossession and attorney's fees, although tech-
nically not included in purchase money debt, should be treated as if
included in purchase money debt for the purposes of priority.
b. The Policy Behind Purchase Money
The treatment of repossession expenses and attorney's fees as part
of the purchase money debt is sensible in light of the policy behind
purchase money priority. If a seller anticipates that expenses incurred
to collect a debt that is given priority will not themselves be given
the same priority, he may be less willing to sell the equipment.
Thus, payments to collect the debt and repossess the collateral should
be viewed as part and parcel of the overall secured transaction and
given the same priority as the finance charge or other credit charges.
4. "Debt Add On" Clauses-Debt Unrelated to
the Equipment Sale
The security agreement may include a clause that the equipment
sold by the secured party to the debtor is subject to the secured
party's " 'security interest therein for the payment of all monies now
or hereafter owed to [the secured party by the debtor] whether
under this security agreement or otherwise.' "' The express terms
of this security agreement provide that the equipment secures not
only its price, but also any past or future amounts advanced by the
69. U.C.C. § 9-504(1)(a), (b).
70. For an example of similar language in a security agreement, see Kawasho
Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Alper (In re Mid-Atlantic Flange Co.). 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
203, 204-05 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (emphasis deleted).
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seller that are totally unrelated to the sale. Under the majority view
of pre-Code conditional sales law, the securing of past or future unre-
lated debt did not destroy a conditional sale contract.7' Title to the
goods could be retained in the seller to secure either the payment of
the price of the goods or the performance of another condition-that
condition could be the payment of past or future unrelated debts. 2
The Code, however, has changed prior law in this regard. A purchase
money security interest can validly secure only the price of the goods
sold and additional amounts spent either to preserve the collateral or
collect the secured debt; it cannot secure debt totally unrelated to
the sale transaction. Consequently, language in the security agree-
ment that attempts to secure such unrelated debt constitutes an im-
permissible "debt add on" clause.
If such a "debt add on" clause were included in the security agree-
ment, however, what effect should this clause have on the seller's
purchase money status and ultimately his purchase money priority?
At least three alternative views are possible: (1) whether or not the
equipment seller actually makes additional loans, the mere presence
of the noxious "debt add on" clause in the security agreement de-
stroys his purchase money security interest in toto; (2) despite the
presence of the noxious clause in the security agreement, only the
actual making of additional loans destroys the purchase money secur-
ity interest in toto; and (3) the actual making of loans does not de-
stroy the purchase money security interest in toto but only pro tanto.
The secured debt must be split into its two parts, a purchase money
part constituting so much of the debt as represents the price of the
computer and a non-purchase money part constituting the "add on"
debt.
The first of these alternatives appears to be the least supportable in
the Code and in the case law. In Kawasho," the court was presented
squarely with a situation in which the security agreement contained a
noxious "debt add on" clause but no additional loans had in fact been
made by the seller of the inventory collateral. The Kawasho court
stated that "we cannot conclude that the presence of the 'add-on'
clause .. .alone can prevent the security interest" from being con-
sidered a purchase money security interest.74 The court in In re
Simpson,7" however, presented the contrary view. Although Simpson
71. See 1 G. Gilmore, supra note 42, § 3.3, at 71; notes 42-47 supra and accom-
panying text.
72. See 1 G. Gilmore, supra note 42, § 3.3, at 71.
73. Kawasho Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Alper (In re Mid-Atlantic Flange Co.), 26
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 203 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
74. Id. at 208 (citation omitted).
75. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 243 (W.D. Mich. 1966). See In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C.




may be distinguished because extra debt was in fact created, dictum
strongly implied that the mere inclusion of a "debt add on" clause
completely destroys a purchase money security interest.' In support
of its position, the Simpson court relied on both the language of Offi-
cial Comment 2 to section 9-1071 and the policy need for purchase
money security interests to be free from "complicated and ambiguous
impedimenta."78  Whatever the implications of Official Comment 2
with respect to section 9-107(b) purchase money security interests,
there is no indication that the Comment was intended to refer to
section 9-107(a) purchase money security interests. As for the need
for simplicity in drafting purchase money security agreements, the
Simpson court totally disregarded the "to the extent" preamble to
section 9-107(a). This language implies that a secured obligation may
have both a purchase money part and a non-purchase money part.-
If Kawasho is correct in holding that the mere presence of "debt
add on" language does not destroy the purchase money character of
the security agreement,60 what if debt beyond the price of the equip-
ment is in fact created? On this question, Simpson seems the case
most in point.8' In Simpson, there was a "debt add on" clause in the
security agreement and additional debt beyond the price had in fact
been created.2 The Simpson court argued that the inclusion of this
extra debt as part of purchase money debt destroyed the purchase
money security interest.3 Thus, the purchase money seller's priority
76. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 246-48.
77. Id. at 246.
78. Id. at 248. The court set out U.C.C. § 9-107, Official Comment 2 in toto.
"'When a purchase money interest is claimed by a secured party who is not a seller,
he must of course have given present consideration. This section therefore provides
that the purchase money party must be one who gives value "by making advances or
incurring an obligation": the quoted language excludes from the purchase money
category any security interest taken as security for or in satisfaction of a pre-edsting
claim or antecedent debt.' " 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 246 (citation omitted).
79. U.C.C. § 9-107(a).
80. Kawasho Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Alper (In re Mid-Atlantic Flange Co.), 26
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 203, 208 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
81. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 243.
82. Id. at 244-45.
83. Id. at 248. In Simpson, the issue presented was whether there %as perfection
of a valid purchase money security interest in farm equipment. The 1962 Official
Text of the U.C.C., § 9-302(1)(c), permitted automatic perfection of purchase money
security interests in farm equipment whose purchase price did not exceed $2,500. If,
however, the "add on debt" destroyed the purchase money character of the security
agreement, there could not have been automatic perfection. Although the Simpson
court ruled that the "add on debt" did destroy the purchase money character of the
sale, the seller did in fact take possession of the collateral and thus perfected his
security interest in an alternate way. The discussion of the requirements of a pur-
chase money security interest was thus irrelevant to the ultimate holding of the case
and hence dictum. Id. at 244-48.
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is lost in toto not merely pro tanto because, by adding on unrelated
debt to the price, the seller never created a valid purchase money
security interest in the first place.84 The more recent Kawasho deci-
sion holds out the hope that the Simpson interpretation may ulti-
mately be rejected. The Kawasho court stated that
[s]ince there were, however, no sales previous to the signing of the
security agreement, and no extensions of credit . . . to the bank-
rupt other than as part of a conditional sale, we leave for another
day the question of whether such extensions of credit would totally
prohibit the characterization of the security agreement as a pur-
chase money security agreement, or whether they would merely
limit the purchase money character of the security interest to that
portion of the debt secured which is taken or retained to secure
the purchase price of the collateral.5
The third alternative, and the one perhaps suggested in the pre-
ceding Kawasho dictum is to permit so much of the debt as repre-
sents the price of the equipment to receive purchase money priority
and so much of the debt as represents "add on" debt not to receive
purchase money priority. Because the third alternative gives meaning
to the "to the extent" preamble in section 9-107(a), it seems to be the
preferable approach. Thus, even if one were to reject the arguments
to include in purchase money debt: (1) the finance charge, filing fees
and insurance premiums," (2) post sale payments to preserve the
value of the collateral," or (3) post sale expenditures incurred to col-
lect the secured debt," the "debt add on" arrangement thus created
should not destroy the purchase money security interest in toto, but
only pro tanto.
If courts adopt this third alternative and permit the "add on debt"
to be separated from the purchase money debt, it would still be
necessary for the equipment seller to demonstrate precisely how
much purchase money debt is outstanding at any given time. For
example, assume S sells B a computer for $1,200 and retains an in-
terest in the computer to secure its price and any future loans to B.
Before B makes any payment on the price of the computer, S lends B
$1,600. S consolidates the $1,200 unpaid purchase price and the
$1,600 loan into one debt of $2,800. B makes a $300 payment on this
consolidated debt and then defaults. S's priority over an earlier se-
cured party with an after-acquired property clause should be limited
84. Id. at 247-48.
85. Kawasho Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Alper (In re Mid-Atlantic Flange Co.), 26
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 203, 209 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
86. See pt. I(A)(1) supra.
87. See pt. I(A)(2) supra.
88. See pt. I(A)(3) supra.
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to the purchase money debt. S must show how much of the $2,500
debt outstanding is purchase money debt, and how much is not
purchase money debt. The burden of tracing the funds is on S.
To meet this burden, the equipment seller must include in the
security agreement an allocation formula that would enable him at
any given time to show how much of the consolidated debt is pur-
chase money debt and how much is not. One simple -allocation for-
mula applies all payments made to the first debt until that debt is
fully paid, and then to the second debt until that debt is full), paid."
In the hypothetical, the $300 payment would be applied to the
amount outstanding on the computer because that was the first debt
created. Thus, S could readily compute the amount of the purchase
debt still outstanding simply by checking the amount paid by B.
Another method of allocating payments will be to apply each payment
pro rata to each debt; the amount of each payment allocated to each
debt would be the proportion of the payment that the original
amount of each debt bore to the entire indebtedness.- The original
price of the computer in the hypothetical is $1,200 and the loan is
$1,600. Since $1,200 is 6/14ths of the total consolidated debt of
$2,800, each payment should be allocated 6/14ths to the purchase
money debt and 8/14ths to the non-purchase money debt. This alloca-
tion formula has been challenged on unconscionability grounds in the
area of consumer finance because it permits a seller to retain an in-
terest in purchase money collateral until every dollar of non-purchase
debt is fully discharged." It may be permissible, however, in the
less protected atmosphere of equipment financing. '1
Thus, if an equipment seller retains an interest in the equipment
to secure its price and debt totally unrelated to its price, he should
not lose his purchase money status entirely as long as he includes an
apportionment formula in the security agreement. He should have
first priority in the collateral for the amount of the purchase money
debt owed. A "first in time" creditor with an after-acquired property
interest would then have second priority in the equipment for the full
amount of his debt. Only after the "first in time" creditor is fully paid
89. For an example of this type of allocation formula, see Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co. v. Staley (In re Staley), 426 F. Supp. 437, 437-38 (M.D. Ca. 19Th).
90. For an example of this type of allocation formula, see In re Brouse, 6 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 471, 474 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
91. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965); In re Jackson, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1152, 1157-58 (W.D. Mo. 1971). But see
In re Brouse, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 471 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
92. Perhaps In re United Thrift Stores, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965),
affd sub nom. Redisco, Inc. v. United Thrift Stores, Inc. (In re United Thrift Stores,
Inc.), 363 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1966), lends some support to this view. In a case of
inventory financing, an apportionment of each payment pro rata to each piece of
appliance collateral seemed to pass without objection.
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will the equipment seller be able to claim the non-purchase money
part of his debt.
Although this result is consistent with logic and the text of section
9-107(a), the prudent equipment seller must realize that a court could
adopt the view of In Re Simpson' and deny purchase money status
whenever unrelated debt is added to the "price."' ' The purchase
money seller may wish to structure his transaction so as to avoid this
potential problem. Although it would increase his transactional costs,
the seller could enter into two separate secured transactions with the
buyer. In the first security agreement, the seller could retain an in-
terest in the equipment to secure its price, and in the second, he
could retain an interest in the equipment to secure the separate debt.
This division of the debt into two parts-a purchase money and non-
purchase money part-each covered by a separate security agree-
ment, should immunize the equipment seller from a Simpson
attack.9" Simpson dealt with one security interest, which encom-
passed both purchase money and non-purchase money debt,' not two
security interests, one of which is purchase money with no "add on"
of unrelated debt and the other of which is non-purchase money with
no "add on" of purchase money debt. If structured in this fashion,
the equipment seller should clearly achieve priority over an after-
acquired property creditor for the purchase money part, but not, of
course, for the non-purchase money part.
5. "Debt Add On" Clauses- Subsequent
Renewal or Refinancing oF the
Purchase Money Debt
In the security agreement, equipment seller S may retain an in-
terest in the computer to secure the outstanding balance due on its
price and any subsequent refinancing or modification of this unpaid
price.' Assume the equipment seller and the buyer initially agree
on a payment schedule whereby the buyer will pay the balance due
on the price over five years. After the sale, however, they decide to
lengthen the payment schedule to eight years. The extension of the
payment schedule results in the buyer paying a larger credit price for
the computer because the credit price of the computer payable over
eight years will be more than its credit price payable over five years.
This incremental amount can be viewed as a species of "add on"
93. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 243 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
94. See notes 81-84 supra and accompanying text.
95. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 243.
96. Id. at 244.
97. See Spector United Employees Credit Union v. Smith, 28 U.C.C. Rcp. Serv.
310, 310-11 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
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debt. Closer analysis, however, reveals that the "price" of the compu-
ter has merely been adjusted to meet changing circumstances; the
amount of the "price" has been increased, but no additional debt has
been added to the "price." The Code does not require that the
"price" be the credit price agreed to at the time of the sale. Secton
2-305(1) permits a seller and buyer to "conclude a contract for sale
even though the price is not settled.""- The price can be agreed to
at a later time. Therefore, as long as the amended security agreement
readjusts the "price" of the equipment, no "debt add on" problem
should be created.9
The equipment seller, however, must be aware that the execution
of a renewal or extension agreement might lead to a different set of
problems threatening, not his purchase money security interest, but
rather his purchase money priority. Under section 9-312(4), purchase
money status does not guarantee purchase money priority. Priority
requires that the seller perfect his purchase money security interest
by filing either before the debtor receives possession of the collateral
or within ten days thereafter.10° If the renewal agreement is viewed
as the discharge of the original security agreement and the execution
of a new security agreement in its place, the seller's purchase money
priority is arguably threatened. The new security interest could not
be perfected until the renewal agreement that created it was signed.
When the renewal agreement was signed, presumably the debtor
already had been in possession of the collateral for more than ten
days.' ' The seller, therefore, has failed to perfect his new security
interest in the equipment within the time period prescribed in sec-
tion 9-312(4) and as a consequence must be denied purchase money
priority."° This unfortunate result can be avoided by careful drafting
of any modification of the original security agreement. The modifica-
tion must be characterized as a mere amendment of the first agree-
ment and not as an entirely new agreement. The courts will generally
accept the parties' characterization of the nature of an agreement.m
98. U.C.C. § 2-305(1).
99. In this regard, see In re Robertson, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 266 (E.D. Tenn.
1969), in which the court pointed out that § 9-107(a) permits a seller to take a pur-
chase money security interest in collateral after its sale as long as the debt secured is
the price of the collateral sold. Id. at 269-70.
100. U.C.C. § 9-312(4). If the financing statement is not filed, the purchase
money security interest becomes unperfected ten days after the debtor receives the
collateral. Barth Bros. v. Billings, 68 Wis. 2d 80, 90, 227 N.W.2d 673, 679 (1975).
101. The seller undoubtedly transferred possession of the equipment to the buyer
at the time of the original purchase money transaction.
102. For a discussion of this problem, see 1B P. Coogan, W. Hogan & D. Vagts,
Secured Transactions Under the UCC § 19.02(1)(c), at 1973 (1980).
103. Whether a renewal agreement merely extends or renews the original debt
depends on the intention of the parties. See Mid-Eastern Elee., Inc. v. First Nat'l
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B. "Collateral Add On" Clauses
If under section 9-107(a) purchase money debt encompasses only
the price of the equipment sold and nothing more, purchase money
collateral may logically be limited to the equipment sold and nothing
more. Therefore, when equipment seller S sells B a computer and
retains a security interest in the computer and other assets of B's to
secure the price of the computer, a "collateral add on" clause would
result. The collateral securing the price of the computer is no longer
simply the computer; it is the computer and the other assets. The
equipment seller might draft a "collateral add on" clause in one of
four ways.
1. "Collateral Add On" Clauses-The Equipment
Sold Plus Derivative Collateral
The security agreement may provide that the creditor retains an
interest in the equipment and in any additional collateral that is de-
rived from the equipment. "Derivative collateral" is the collateral
that results from the disposition or processing of the original piece of
collateral. The two main forms of derivative collateral are "pro-
ceeds"-what is received upon the disposition of the collateral ""-
and "products"- what is left after the original collateral is processed
or manufactured into something else. '5
a. Proceeds Collateral
Section 9-306(1) defines "proceeds" as "whatever is received upon
the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral." 10
The equipment seller may retain a security interest in the equipment
sold and its proceeds to secure its price. By making the proceeds, as
well as the equipment sold, serve as collateral, a "collateral add on"
arrangement seems to be created. Three distinct forms of "proceeds
Bank, 455 F.2d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 1970); Spector United Employees Credit Union v.
Smith, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 310, 313-14 (NC. Ct. App. 1980). The intent of the
parties, however, must be made clear in the appropriate documents.
104. U.C.C. § 9-306(1). Inferentially, the Code may recognize a third form of
"derivative" collateral-an "'increase." See U.C.C. § 9-207(2)(c). But as Professor Gil-
more has remarked, it is unlikely that machine equipment will reproduce itself. 2 G.
Gilmore, supra note 42, § 42.8, at 1153-54.
105. U.C.C. § 9-315(1). For an example of a secured party who claimed a non-
purchase money security interest in all derivative, accessional, and substitute col-
lateral, see Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1153 (3d Cir. 1979). This language is fairly standard in an after-acquired property
clause. In essence, when a purchase money lender tries to "add on" additional de-
rivative, accessional, or substitute collateral, he is attempting to create a type of
after-acquired property interest through a purchase money security interest.
106. U.C.C. § 9-306(1),
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add on" clauses must be considered: (1) when the security agreement
mentions proceeds as additional collateral, but the equipment is not
in fact resold, and thus no proceeds are ever generated, (2) when the
security agreement mentions proceeds as additional collateral and the
equipment is resold with the authorization of the original seller, and
(3) when the security agreement mentions proceeds as additional col-
lateral and the equipment is resold without the authorization of the
original seller.
In the first situation, because the equipment is not resold, no pro-
ceeds are ever generated. This seems analogous to the situation pre-
viously discussed in which language in the security agreement co-
vered "add on" debt, but no such "add on" debt was in fact created.
The Kawasho holding that the mere presence of "add on" language
does not affect a purchase money security interest should control
here as well.'° In the second situation, the equipment is resold with
the authorization of the seller and proceeds are generated. Section
9-306(2) of the Code provides that when the sale is authorized, the
seller loses his security interest in the equipment, but receives in
exchange a security interest in the "identifiable proceeds" of the sale.
This is a one-for-one substitution of collateral, rather than a true "col-
lateral add on." Only the third situation, when the equipment is sold
without the authorization of the seller, represents a true "collateral
add on" arrangement. Under section 9-306(2), when the sale is unau-
thorized, the seller retains his security interest in the equipment and
additionally receives a security interest in the "identifiable proceeds"
of the sale. Under these circumstances, however, the Code automati-
cally permits proceeds to be added to the equipment sold and allows
both to serve as purchase money collateral. Thus, a seller's purchase
money security interest and priority in equipment will continue in
the identifiable proceeds of that equipment. This conclusion requires
a two step analysis. First, section 9-203(3) states that a security agree-
ment gives the seller the right to proceeds. Section 9-306(2) then
states that when collateral is resold without the original seller's au-
thorization, a security interest continues in the original collateral and
in any identifiable proceeds received from a disposition of the col-
lateral. The Code clearly permits a security interest in equipment to
continue automatically in the identifiable proceeds of that equipment.
Because it is automatic, the security agreement need not contain a
specific clause identifying the proceeds as additional collateral.
Second, these Code sections apply to all security interests, and a
purchase money security interest is simply one subcategory of secur-
107. See Kawasho Int'l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Alper (In re Mid-Atlantic Flange, Co.). 26




ity interest. It therefore is reasonable to conclude that a purchase
money security interest should also continue automatically in the
identifiable proceeds. In the case of equipment collateral, this conclu-
sion is buttressed by the purchase money priority rule of section 9-
312(4), which states that a purchase money security interest in col-
lateral other than inventory has priority in the original collateral or its
proceeds if the security interest is perfected at the time the debtor
receives possession of the collateral or within ten days thereafter.,,
b. Products Collateral
A "product" is what results from the processing of goods in such a
way that the original identity of the goods is lost in the finished
product.'0 Therefore, a seller might retain a security interest in raw
materials sold and in any product of these raw materials to secure the
price of the raw materials. To the extent that the finished product
represents more value than the raw materials, the seller has "added
on" to purchase money collateral more than he sold-the raw mate-
rials. It is highly unlikely that equipment will be so processed by the
debtor that the original equipment loses its identity in a new finished
product. As a consequence, the seller of equipment will seldom be in
a position to claim a purchase money interest in both the equipment
sold and in any products of that equipment. Because it is so unlikely
to occur, the "collateral add on" problems created by taking a pur-
chase money security interest in equipment and products of that
equipment will not be discussed.1 '
2. "Collateral Add On" Clauses-The Equipment
Sold Plus Substitute Collateral
In the security agreement, the equipment seller may retain a
security interest in the equipment and any replacements of that
equipment to secure the price of the equipment. This form of clause
does not present the classic "collateral add on" problem. If the origi-
nal equipment sold is replaced by another piece of equipment, there
has not been an "add on" of collateral but rather a one-for-one sub-
stitution of collateral. The replacement becomes the only collateral;
the original equipment no longer stands as collateral. A replacement
clause in the security agreement, however, may still create difficulties
for the equipment seller regarding his purchase money status.
108. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
109. See U.C.C. § 9-315(1)(a).
110. For a brief discussion of these problems in the context of U.C.C. § 9-107(b)
inventory financing, see Jackson & Kronman, A Plea For the Financing Buyer, 85
Yale L.J. 1, 28-29 (1975).
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a. Replacements Provided by the Seller
A seller may reserve in the security agreement the right to replace
non-conforming equipment with conforming equipment"' and make
the conforming equipment serve as purchase money collateral. This
situation should not involve the seller in section 9-107(a) difficulties.
The equipment sold is in reality meant to be the conforming
equipment; the seller thus retains a purchase money security interest
in the conforming equipment to secure its price. The non-conforming
equipment will undoubtedly be returned to the seller; therefore, no
"collateral add on" problem should arise.
b. Replacements That Are Essentially Proceeds
If the buyer trades or exchanges the original equipment for other
equipment, the Code would characterize the replacement equipment
as "Proceeds." 112 It has been demonstrated that an equipment sell-
er's purchase money security interest and priority continue in iden-
tifiable proceeds and thus should continue in this identifiable pro-
ceeds replacement."' A more difficult problem would arise, how-
ever, if the debtor, instead of trading the original equipment for the
replacement, first sells the original equipment and then with the
111. The Code defines "conforming" as "in accordance with the obligations under
the contract." U.C.C. § 2-106(2).
112. The replacement equipment would be specifically characterized as "non-cash
proceeds." Id. § 9-306(1).
113. California has added a non-uniform paragraph to U.C.C. § 9-102. This para-
graph numbered (4) reads: "[nlotwithstanding anything to the contrary in this divi-
sion, no nonpossessory security interest, other than a purchase money security in-
terest, may be given or taken in or to the inventory of a retail merchant held for
sale, except in or to inventory consisting of durable goods having a unit retail value
of at least five hundred dollars ($500) or motor vehicles, house trailers, trailers, semi-
trailers, farm and construction machinery and repair parts thereof, or aircraft....
The phrase 'purchase money security interest' as used in this subdivision does not
extend to any after-acquired property other than the initial property sold by a se-
cured party or taken by a lender as security as provided in section 9107.... " Cal.
Com. Code § 9102(4) (West Supp. 1981). This prohibition against purchase money
security interests in after-acquired inventory property has been interpreted to pro-
hibit a purchase money security interest in replacements of inventory. See Raleigh
Indus. of Am. v. Tassone, 74 Cal. App. 3d 692, 141 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1977). But see
Holzman v. L.H.J. Enterprises, Inc., 476 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1973). cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1135 (1974) (permitting purchase money security interests in replacements
under an older version of this paragraph). The California provision only relates to
replacements of inventory collateral-not to replacements of equipment collateral.
Because a purchase money financier of inventory does not usually receive priority in
proceeds of inventory under U.C.C. § 9-312(3), stating that a purchase money secur-
ity interest cannot exist in replacement inventory collateral is consistent with the
priority rules for inventory. It would not necessarily be consistent, however, vith the
U.C.C. § 9-312(4) priority rules for equipment.
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money received from the sale buys the replacement equipment. The
replacement equipment would be the proceeds of cash proceeds, but
the Code defines proceeds in section 9-306(1) to include proceeds of
proceeds. Presumably, the equipment seller could justify his pur-
chase money priority in the replacement equipment if the cash pro-
ceeds with which it was purchased is identifiable as the cash proceeds
received from the sale of the original piece of equipment. This re-
quires a traceable linkage between the original equipment sold and
the replacement equipment purchased.
c. Replacements That Are Equipment Already Owned by the Buyer
In an unusual situation, the buyer of equipment might be given
the right in the security agreement to substitute his other equipment
as equivalent collateral in lieu of the original equipment purchased
from the seller. If the buyer exercises this option, the seller runs the
risk of losing purchase money status. The substitute equipment might
not be characterized as "proceeds." Although the term "exchange" is
not defined in section 9-306(1), the original equipment does not
appear to have been "exchanged" so that the substitute equipment
could be treated as "proceeds." "Exchange," of course, could be read
to include a substitution of equipment by one party, but the juxta-
position of the term with the terms "sale" and "other disposition"
may imply a trade of equipment with another party. If the replace-
ment or substitute collateral does not constitute "proceeds," section
9-107(a) requires that purchase money collateral be limited to goods
sold by the seller. If the secured party has agreed to release his
security interest in the original equipment sold upon the substitution
of other collateral already owned by the buyer, he could not claim a
purchase money security interest in either the original equipment or
the replacement. Under these circumstances, the equipment seller
has the task of convincing a court that, even though not "proceeds,"
the replacement collateral substituted by the buyer should be treated
as the equivalent of proceeds.
3. "Collateral Add On" Clauses-The Equipment
Sold Plus Accessional Collateral
In the security agreement, equipment seller S may retain an in-
terest in the computer and in any other collateral that is installed in,
affixed to, or in some way joined with the equipment. Such collateral
is called "accessional" collateral."4 The main categories of "accession-
al" collateral are fixtures, accessions, and additions. A treatment of
fixtures is beyond the scope of this Article, and the discussion will
114. See U.C.C. § 9-314.
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therefore be limited to "accessions" and "additions.", "Accessions"
are goods that are installed in or affixed to other goods so that the
resulting combination is an integral whole."6 "Additions," a term not
used in the Code, are goods joined with other goods, but not in such
a way that they become "accessions." "' The Code does not indicate
the degree to which goods must be affixed to other goods to consti-
tute an "accession," "I and therefore, it is difficult to draw a bright
line between an "accession" and an "addition." A precise distinction
is unnecessary, however, because the "collateral add on" problems
are identical with respect to "accessions" and "additions."
a. Accessions
Assume creditor X has a perfected security interest in debtor's
equipment and after-acquired equipment. Equipment seller S now
sells a new computer to the debtor, retaining an interest in the com-
puter and any accessions as security for the unpaid purchase price.
The debtor subsequently makes improvements in the computer by
adding to it other pieces of equipment so that the added pieces be-
come "accessions." These "accessions," however, are already owned
by the debtor and hence are already subject to creditor X's after-
acquired security interest in the debtor's equipment. Does S's pur-
chase money security interest in the computer carry over to these
"accessions," giving S priority over X in both the equipment sold and
the "accessions?"
By claiming an interest in any accessions, S, of course, is attempt-
ing to "add on" more collateral to his original equipment collateral.
The Code, however, does not entitle an equipment seller either to a
purchase money interest in or priority in "accessions" to the original
collateral. First, section 9-107(a) states that a seller can have a pur-
chase money interest only in collateral that he sells to the buyer."'i
115. For the Code's treatment of security interests in fixtures, see id. § 9-313.
116. See id. § 9-314.
117. Not all "additions" to goods are "accessions." See Jacklitch v. Redstone Fed.
Credit Union, 615 F.2d 679, 680-81 (5th Cir. 1980).
118. See Mixon v. Georgia Bank, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 827 (Ca. Ct. App. 1980).
119. Of course if the "accessions" had also been sold to the debtor by the equip-
ment seller, the seller could retain a purchase money security interest in them to
secure payment of their price. In In re Merrill, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 755 (D. Neb.
1971), the seller sold a mobile home and household appliances located in the home,
retaining a security interest in the mobile home and appliances to secure the price of
the mobile home. Although the court did not discuss whether the appliances were
"accessions" or "additions," it is important to note that they were sold by the seller
to the buyer. Because the price of the mobile home included the price of the ap-
pliances, the seller could retain a purchase money security interest in them to secure
the price of the home. Apportionment, however, could have become an issue had it
been raised.
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Because the equipment seller did not sell the accessions to the
buyer, the very definition of a purchase money security interest
seems to rule out the inclusion of these accessions in purchase money
collateral. 2  The equipment seller would have a purchase money
security interest in the equipment, but only an ordinary security in-
terest in the accessions. Second, although the Code provides that a
security interest in original collateral automatically continues in
proceeds,12z it does not state that a security interest in original col-
lateral automatically continues in accessions. Consequently, there is
no textual basis in the Code for the argument that a purchase money
security interest in equipment sold to a buyer may continue as a
purchase money security interest in accessions that were not sold to
the buyer. Finally, unlike its treatment of proceeds of equipment,
the Code does not state that a purchase money security interest in
equipment receives priority in accessions as well. Indeed, section 9-
314(1) states the contrary." Because the security interest of creditor
X attached to the accessions before they were affixed to the equip-
ment, section 9-314(1) would grant creditor X priority in the acces-
sions over any interest claimed by equipment seller S. '2
b. Additions
If the Code does not permit a purchase money seller to "add on"
accessions to equipment, clearly the same analysis would preclude
the purchase money seller from attempting to add on as extra col-
lateral any "additions" to equipment. The seller of the equipment
would also not be the seller of the "additions" to that equipment;
the "additions" could therefore not secure payment of their price.
Similarly, the Code does not state that a security interest-much less
a purchase money security interest-automatically continues in
"additions" to collateral.
4. "Collateral Add On" Clauses-Additional
Property Already Owned by the Debtor
and Not Sold by the Seller
In a purchase money transaction under section 9-107(a), the col-
lateral securing the debt consists of the item sold and, when
120. See U.C.C. § 9-107.
121. Id. § 9-306(1), (2).
122. The Code provides that "[a] security interest in goods which attaches before
they are installed in or affixed to other goods takes priority as to the goods installed
or affixed (called in this section 'accessions') over the claims of all persons to the
whole except as stated in subsection (3) and subject to Section 9-315(1)." Id. § 9-
314(1).
123. See id.
124. For a security agreement in which the secured party sought a security In-
terest in "additions" attached to collateral, see Jacklitch v. Redstone Fed. Credit
Union, 615 F.2d 679, 680 (5th Cir. 1980).
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appropriate, its proceeds. If equipment seller S sells B a computer, S
may retain an interest in the computer and its proceeds to secure the
unpaid balance of its price. If the equipment will rapidly depreciate
in value, however, S may ask B to provide additional collateral to
secure the purchase price of the corihputer. As a consequence, B may
grant S a security interest in other assets that he already owns to
secure the debt. Under these circumstances, a "collateral add on"
situation would be created; seller S has a security interest in the
equipment and in the additional assets to secure the equipment
purchase price.
Although the pre-Code law of conditional sales generally sanctioned
the use of these "collateral add on" clauses,0 the Code adopts a more
restrictive attitude toward them. Under the Code, they should be
treated in the same manner as unrelated "debt add on" clauses.,, If
purchase money debt should include the price of the equipment sold
plus additional amounts expended to preserve the collateral or to col-
lect the debt,'w but nothing more, purchase money collateral should
include the equipment sold and its proceeds, but nothing more. This
limitation comports with the policy underlying purchase money prior-
ity. Because the "add on" collateral does not constitute new assets,
the acquisition of which was financed by the equipment seller, there
is no reason to give the seller priority in these "add on" assets.
What effect should the attempted inclusion of this "add on" col-
lateral have on the equipment seller's purchase money status? If the
security agreement contains a "collateral add on" clause, the presence
of the clause should not completely destroy the purchase money char-
acter of the transaction. The "to the extent" preamble to section 9-
107(a) requires a division of the collateral into two parts-the pur-
chase money collateral, the equipment sold, and the non-purchase
money collateral, the other assets.'1 The equipment seller would
then have the burden of demonstrating which collateral is the pur-
chase money collateral and which collateral is not. In this case, the
equipment seller should be able to meet this tracing burden whether
or not an apportionment formula is included in the security
agreement m Fungibility problems aside, when purchase money col-
125. See L. Jones, The Law of Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales § 1228
(6th ed. 1908).
126. See pt. I(A)(4) supra.
127. See pt. I(A) supra.
128. A purchase money security interest cannot exist in collateral not sold by the
seller. See Raleigh Indus. of Am., Inc. v. Tassone, 74 Cal. App. 3d 692, 699, 141
Cal. Rptr. 641, 645 (1977).
129. In contrast, the equipment seller must have an apportionment formula to
segregate purchase money debt from non-purchase money debt. See notes 89-92 sup-
ra and accompanying text.
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lateral and non-purchase money collateral both secure the price debt,
each piece of collateral will presumably maintain its separate identity
and thus can easily be pinpointed. In practical terms, assume that
creditor X has a perfected security interest in B's equipment and af-
ter-acquired equipment. Equipment seller S then sells B a computer
and takes a security interest in the computer and in other equipment
assets already owned by B to secure the price of the computer. B
defaults on his payments to both X and S. S would have priority only
in the computer because it is purchase money collateral; he should
have no difficulty in separating the computer from his non-purchase
money collateral.'"
This result is consistent with logic and the text of section 9-107(a).
The danger remains, however, that a court may adopt the In re
Simpson approach and claim that one security interest cannot cover
purchase money and non-purchase money collateral. 3' The equip-
ment seller may thus wish to adopt a more expensive but more con-
servative course-the course previously suggested to deal with the
problem of "debt add on" clauses.13 He could enter into two sepa-
rate secured transactions with the buyer. In the first security agree-
ment, he could retain an interest in the equipment sold to secure its
price, and in the second security agreement, he could retain an in-
terest in the other collateral to secure the price of the equipment
sold.'- There appears to be little objection to securing the same
debt with different collateral in separate transactions.
C. "Debt Collateral Add On" Clauses
The "debt collateral add on" clause constitutes the most compli-
cated type of "add on" clause. Combining features of both "debt add
on" and "collateral add on" clauses, it appears most commonly in the
multiple sale context. The seller sells several pieces of equipment to
a buyer, securing the combined prices of all the equipment with each
130. In Burlington Nat'l Bank v. Strauss, 50 Wis. 2d 270, 184 N.W.2d 122 (1971),
a seller sold cattle to a debtor, retaining a security interest in the cattle sold to
secure their price. Subsequently, the seller took a chattel mortgage on a grinder
mixer as additional collateral to secure the price of the cattle. It should be recog-
nized, however, that the original conditional sale contract for the cattle did not in-
clude the mixer as collateral, but a subsequent chattel mortgage added on the mixer
as additional collateral. Although it did not discuss the issue in terms of the "add on"
problem, the court correctly ruled that the seller had priority over an after-acquired
property secured party in the cattle but not in the mixer. Id. at 276-77, 184 N.W.2d
at 125.
131. 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 243, 246 (W.D. Mich. 1966); notes 75-79 supra and
accompanying text.
132. See notes 93-96 supra and accompanying text.




piece of equipment.1 34  For example, creditor X has a perfected
security interest in B's existing equipment and after-acquired equip-
ment. Equipment seller S now sells a computer to B for $1,500. In
the security agreement, S retains an interest in the computer to se-
cure its price and the price of any other equipment that S either has
sold or will sell to B.1- S then sells a lathe to B for $500. The
second security agreement involving the lathe contains "add on" lan-
guage identical with that in the first security agreement. In addition,
it combines the price of the computer and the price of the lathe into
a consolidated balance of $2,000 and requires B to make one monthly
payment of $200 on this consolidated balance. Each monthly payment
is to be fully applied first to the first item purchased until that item is
paid off, and then to the second item purchased, until that item is
paid off. A careful analysis reveals that equipment seller S has re-
tained an interest in the computer to secure its price and the price of
the lathe, "debt add on," and, alternatively, the price of the compu-
ter is secured by the computer and by the lathe, "collateral add on.
The same "add on" situation exists with respect to the lathe. S has
retained an interest in the lathe to secure its price and the price of
the computer, "debt add on," and the price of the lathe is secured by
the lathe and by the computer, "collateral add on." Thus, the "debt
collateral add on" clause consists of an impermissible "debt add on"
clause combined with an impermissible "collateral add on" clause.
If, after his first monthly payment of $200, B defaults on his pay-
ments both to S and X, X will claim priority in the computer and
lathe on the theory that the "debt collateral add on" clause destroys
S's purchase money status entirely.' S may counter with the argu-
ment that the "debt collateral add on" clause results in a security
interest that is part purchase money and part non-purchase
money."s He will claim purchase money priority over X only for the
purchase money part. As a theoretical proposition, S has a strong
134. See In re Jackson, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1152 (W.D. Mo. 1971). Although
most cases involve situations in which the seller sold debtor various pieces of col-
lateral at different times, Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce (In re Manuel), 507 F.2d
990 (5th Cir. 1975), W.S. Badcock Corp. v. Banks (In re Norrell), 426 F. Supp. 435
(M.D. Ga. 1977), Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Staley (In re Stale'). 426 F. Supp.
437 (M.D. Ga. 1977), the sale of different pieces of collateral in the same contract on
the same day may also occur. See, e.g., American Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. Inter-
national Harvester Credit Corp., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 682, 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972).
135. If no other equipment has been or will be sold, the original equipment se-
cures only its price, and the mere presence of "add on" language in a security agree-
ment should not affect the equipment seller's purchase money status. See notes 73-79
supra and accompanying text.
136. See In re Simpson, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 243, 248 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
137. See notes 86-92, 128-30 supra and accompanying text.
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argument. The equipment seller could contend that the "to the ex-
tent" preamble to section 9-107 must be applied in this situation. S
should retain a purchase money security interest in the computer
only to the extent that the computer secures its price, and an ordi-
nary security interest in the computer to the extent that it secures
more than its price, the price of the lathe. S could demonstrate the
amounts still outstanding on the price of the computer and the price
of the lathe because he has had the foresight to include an apportion-
ment formula in the security agreement. After B's $200 payment,
$1,300 remains outstanding on the price of the computer and $500
remains outstanding on the price of the lathe. By combining the "to
the extent" preamble and the apportionment formula, S can claim a
purchase money security interest in the computer to the extent that it
secures the amount due on its price. The purchase money debt in-
cludes the price of the computer but excludes the price of the lathe.
Alternatively, the purchase money collateral is only the computer and
not the lathe. Through the apportionment formula, S can precisely
demonstrate how much of the price of the computer is outstanding
and that this is the amount secured by the computer for the purposes
of section 9-107. The same reasoning can be applied to the lathe. He
would argue, therefore, that he should have purchase money priority
over X pro tanto in both the computer and the lathe.
The argument, although complex, is clearly defensible. Yet, even if
one were willing to accept each of the steps of the argument, what
has S gained by including the "debt collateral add on" clause in the
security agreement? The equipment seller has a purchase money
security interest in the computer to secure its outstanding price of
$1,300 and a purchase money security interest in the lathe to secure
its outstanding price of $500. Presumably, by including a "debt col-
lateral add on" clause, S wants more. He wants the computer and the
lathe to secure both their own price and the price of the other piece
of equipment. The "debt collateral add on" clause, however, cannot
expand S's purchase money security interest in either the computer
or the lathe; therefore, the clause cannot enlarge his priority rights
over creditor X. The only apparent benefit gained by including the
clause is that, in addition to his purchase money security interests in
the equipment, S has an ordinary security interest in the computer to
secure the price of the lathe and an ordinary security interest in the
lathe to secure the price of the computer. In practical terms, this is a
minimal benefit. Assume that equipment seller S repossesses the
computer and lathe and sells both pieces to pay off the debt. Assume
also that he receives $1,500 for the computer and $300 for the lathe.
The outstanding amount due on the computer was $1,300, and S has
purchase money priority in the computer only for this amount. He
has purchase money priority in the lathe for $500, but only $300 was
realized on the sale. S would like to apply the extra $200 received
from the sale of the computer to discharge the $200 remaining on the
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price of the lathe. Unfortunately, he has only an ordinary security
interest in the computer to secure any amounts in excess of $1,300.
An after-acquired creditor has priority over all later creditors with
regular security interests." Equipment seller S has no right to the
extra $200 realized on the sale of the computer until creditor X has
been fully repaid the amount of his loan. In essence, then, the equip-
ment seller gains very little by including the "debt collateral add on"
clause in the security agreement. In this instance, S only gains a
junior interest in the extra $200 received from the sale of the compu-
ter to secure an amount still due on the lathe.
The benefits of this small gain must be weighed against the risks
inherent in the use of a "debt collateral add on" clause. First, the
equipment seller may forget to include an apportionment formula or
include one that may be attacked on unconscionability grounds,, He
cannot maintain his purchase money status even pro tanto without a
valid and enforceable apportionment formula in the security agree-
ment. Second, a court may be reluctant to read the "to the extent"
preamble in the manner suggested by this Article. A review of "debt
collateral add on" cases demonstrates the seriousness of this latter
risk.
The leading case involving a "debt collateral add on" clause is
Roberts Furniture Co. v. Pierce (In re Manuel)."0 On December 7,
1972, the debtor Manuel purchased furniture from the seller and
signed a security agreement, the exact wording of which is not re-
ported in the opinion."' On February 13, 1973, Manuel made an
additional purchase of a television set from the seller. The purchase
money security agreement signed on February 13th referred to the
unpaid balance on the furniture and consolidated that balance with
the unpaid balance on the television set. The February 13th security
agreement also contained the following language: "[g]oods may secure
all present and future liabilities, debts and obligations of whatever
nature of BUYER to SELLER or its assigns." - This language cre-
ated the "debt collateral add on" problem. On the debt side, the
furniture secured its price and something more than its price; it se-
cured all future liabilities, in this case the price of the later purchased
television set. On the collateral side, the price of the television set, a
present liability, was secured by "goods," presumably the television
set itself and something more, the earlier purchased furniture. Re-
lying on his assumed purchase money security interest in consumer
goods, the seller did not file a financing statement to perfect his
138. See U.C.C. §§ 9-204(1), -312(5), (6).
139. See notes 91-92 supra and accompanying text.
140. 507 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975).
141. A security agreement of some form was signed. Id. at 991.
142. Id. at 992.
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security interest.' Manuel subsequently filed a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy. When the seller sought reclamation of both items from
the trustee in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy judge permitted reclama-
tion of the television set, finding that the seller did have a perfected
purchase money security interest in that item, but refused reclama-
tion of the furniture. The District Court not only upheld the bank-
ruptcy judge's ruling as to the furniture, it would have also denied
reclamation of the television set had the issue been preserved on
cross-appeal. The Circuit Court, in turn, upheld the denial of re-
clamation of the furniture, but expressed no opinion as to the televi-
sion set. "4 The Circuit Court reasoned that, because the February
13th agreement made the furniture purchased on December 7th col-
lateral for its price and for all future liabilities, a valid purchase
money security interest did not attach because the furniture secured
its price and something more than its price, the price of the televi-
sion set. 145
If the court had accepted the "to the extent" preamble, it could
have found that the seller had a purchase money security interest in
the furniture to the extent that it secured its price. The court might
then have required the seller to demonstrate how much of the price
of the furniture was outstanding; this would have required the seller
to utilize an apportionment formula in the security agreement. The
court noted the absence of such a formula, but the basis of its holding
was that the furniture secured more than its price, not that the seller
could not demonstrate how much of' this price was still
outstanding. 146 By so holding, the court inferentially refused to apply
the "to the extent" preamble.14
That a court's decision on whether to apply the "to the extent"
preamble may not be clearly articulated is further illustrated by the
inconsistent decisions in W.S. Badcock Corp. v. Banks (In re
Norrel)48 and In re Brouse."9 In Norrell, the security agreement
made each item sold secure its price and the price of any subsequent
purchase. The security agreement, however, did not contain an
143. Id. at 991. A purchase money security interest in consumer goods is auto-
matically perfected in most states under U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d). Kansas, to cite but one
state, however, has not included this subsection in its version of the Code. Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 84-9-302 (Supp. 1980).
144. 507 F.2d at 994.
145. Id. at 992-93. In In re Jackson, 9 U.C.C. Rep Serv. 1152, 1157 (W.D. Mo.
1971), the court stated that a purchase money security interest existed in an item
purchased, but as soon as other items were purchased and the first item was made to
stand as security for the prices of these later purchased items, the purchase money
security interest was lost.
146. 507 F.2d at 993.
147. U.C.C. § 9-107.
148. 426 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Ga. 1977).
149. 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 471 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
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apportionment formula.' 50 The debtor purchased two items, and
their purchase prices were consolidated into one outstanding balance.
State retail installment legislation, however, provided that payments
on revolving accounts were to be applied first to the goods first
purchased. The Norrell court found that even if this statutory appor-
tionment formula were read into the security agreement, a valid
purchase money security interest in the first item purchased would
not have been created. The security agreement by its own terms had
made the first item purchased secure more than its price. The statu-
tory apportionment formula, the court reasoned, could not alter how
the parties chose to draft the security agreement. Despite the statu-
tory apportionment formula, the first item purchased still secured its
own price and the price of the second item purchased. The Norrell
court thus seemed unwilling to apply the "to the extent" language of
section 9-107 in conjunction with the statutory apportionment formu-
la. If it had, a purchase money security interest in the first item
purchased would have been permitted to the extent that it secured
payment of the amount outstanding on its price and this amount out-
standing could have been shown through the apportionment formula.
The Brouse court,15' however, reached a different conclusion on
similar facts. In Brouse, the seller sold the buyer various items and
consolidated the balance owed on these items. It appears that each
item sold secured its price and the price of every other item, and the
security agreement lacked any apportionment formula."-' Although
the court found that no purchase money security interest attached to
a stereo purchased in 1965 because the stereo secured its price plus
the price of future purchases, it did find that a purchase money
security interest attached to a cupboard purchased in 1966. The court
justified its disparate treatment of the two purchases by noting the
enactment of retail installment legislation in 1966 after the stereo had
been purchased, but before the cupboard had been purchased.' m This
legislation required payments to be allocated to each item in the
same ratio as the original sale price of each item bore to the total of
all purchases. As previously noted in the Norrell' analysis, even if
this formula were read into the security agreement, it would not have
corrected the debt and collateral "add on" problems created by the
language of the security agreement-unless the court also accepted
the "to the extent" language of section 9-107. Inferentially, by up-
holding the purchase money security interest in the cupboard, the
150. 426 F. Supp. at 436.
151. In re Brouse, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 471 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
152. Id. at 471-72.
153. Id. at 474-75.




Brouse court seems to have accepted using the apportionment form-
ula and the "to the extent" language in combination.' '
From a reading of the leading cases, the prudent seller must real-
ize that certain courts have been harsh in dealing with "debt collater-
al add on" clauses, and he should use this type of clause only after
careful deliberation. If he analyzes why he wishes to include the
clause, he may discover that he can accomplish his objective by
other, less dangerous, means. The equipment seller who wants the
convenience of a single monthly payment for the total debt owed him
by the buyer may achieve this objective without using a "debt col-
lateral add on" clause. For example, the security agreement in In re
Staley 1- provided that
[debtor] hereby grant~s] to [secured party] a security interest in
each item of merchandise purchased or hereafter purchased under
this Agreement, and [secured party] shall retain such security in-
terest in each item of merchandise until it is paid for in full. Accor-
dingly ... installment payments will be applied as follows: In the
case of items purchased on different dates, the item first purchased
shall be deemed paid for first; in the case of items purchased on
the same date, the lowest priced item shall be deemed paid for
first. ,5
This security agreement grants the seller a security interest in each
item sold only to secure its price and, therefore, avoids any "debt
add on" problem. No "collateral add on" problem is created because
the price of each item is secured only by that item. The security
agreement, however, does permit the purchase prices of all the items
sold to be consolidated, and it correctly provides an allocation form-
ula to apportion payments. Use of the Staley fbrm of security agree-
ment poses only minimal risks for the secured party." The only
problem that might arise is a challenge to the type of apportionment
formula used. The "first bought, first paid for" model used in Staley
appears immune from unconscionability attack. Apportionment for-
mulas that apply each payment pro rata to each debt have been suc-
cessfully attacked on unconscionability grounds in the context of con-
sumer finance, but even these formulas may be acceptable in the less
protected atmosphere of equipment financing.3 9
155. In re Brouse, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 471, 475-76 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
156. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Staley (In re Staley), 426 F. Supp. 437
(M.D. Ga. 1977).
157. Id. at 437.
158. In Firestone Stores v. Henderson, 27 Ohio Misc. 160, 269 N.E.2d 75 (Mun.
Ct. 1971), the secured party required the debtor to sign a new retail installment
contract (security agreement) for each purchase. Each item purchased secured only
its price. The prices of the items were apparently not oansolidated. Thus, there was
neither an "add on" problem nor a tracing problem.
159. See notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text.
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The equipment seller who desires the added protection of having
each piece of equipment secure the price of each other piece must
then face the ultimate question whether this added protection is
worth the risk. If he decides that the added protection is worth
jeopardizing his purchase money status entirely, he should consider
ways to minimize his risk. The use of multiple security agreements
may be effective. The seller and buyer can sign a security agreement
similar to the Staleyl'w model in which each piece of equipment se-
cures only its price. The prices of each item could then be consoli-
dated, and one monthly payment required. The seller and buyer
could then sign another security agreement making all the equipment
also stand as security for the total consolidated debt. A court may be
more willing to accept the seller's contention that, under the first
security agreement, he retains purchase money interests in each item
of equipment, and under the second security agreement, he retains
non-purchase money interests in the same items.
II. THE PURCHASE MONEY FINANCIER OF EQUIPMENT
In Part II of the Article, the focus of the analysis will shift from the
seller-buyer purchase money security interest under section 9-107(a)
to the financier-buyer purchase money security interest under section
9-107(b). Because the precise language of section 9-107(b) is critical to
the analysis, the section is set forth in its entirety.
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the
extent that it is
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an
obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or
the use of collateral if such value is in fact so used.'
In the financier-buyer purchase money transaction the financier
does not sell the collateral directly to the buyer, but rather finances
its purchase from a third party seller. For example, if B wishes to
buy a computer from equipment seller S, he may approach financier
F to provide the financing for the purchase. F will customarily ad-
vance the price of the computer directly to S and take a security
interest in this equipment to secure the loan. The equipment actually
purchased with the advance constitutes the purchase money collat-
eral, and the amount advanced that was "in fact ... used" to acquire
160. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Staley (In re Staley), 426 F. Supp. 437, 437
(M.D. Ga. 1977).
161. U.C.C. § 9-107(b). For a discussion of this paragraph, see 2 G. Gilmore,
supra note 42, § 29.2, at 781-84; McLaughlin, Qualifying as a Third-Party Purchase




rights in the equipment is the purchase money debt. If this simple
structure is altered by the addition of either more collateral than the
equipment purchased on the collateral side, or more debt than the
amount in fact used to acquire rights in the equipment on the debt
side, an "add on" arrangement would be created.
The analysis developed in Part I of this Article with respect to "add
on" clauses and the section 9-107(a) equipment seller will more often
than not be directly applicable to the section 9-107(b) equipment
financier. There are certain situations, however, when the particular
language of section 9-107(b) may make the conclusions reached with
respect to equipment sellers more doubtful with respect to equip-
ment financiers. The discussion in Part II will focus primarily on
these situations.
A. "Debt Add On" Clauses
1. "Debt Add On" Clauses-Amounts Expended
at the Time of Sale for Charges
Related to the Sale
It was previously shown that certain incidental sales related charges
should be included in "the price" of the equipment sold and consti-
tute purchase money debt. 6 ' Because the language of section 9-
107(b) does not use the term "price," these incidental charges, if they
are to be included in purchase money debt, must be considered part
of an advance made by the equipment financier that was "in fact ...
used" to acquire rights in the equipment.
In Part I, these incidental charges were divided into two groups.
One group included sales taxes and charges for delivery and installa-
tion of the collateral and for extended warranty coverage. These
charges are paid by a buyer in an all cash sale; they are part of the
"cash price" of the equipment and thus part of the purchase money
"price" for the purposes of section 9-107(a). The equipment financier
under section 9-107(b) should also be able to include them in pur-
chase money debt. S, who sells the computer, will charge B for these
costs, and F will be required to advance S funds sufficient to cover
these costs to enable B "to acquire rights" in the computer. If F
makes out his check to the order of S and B jointly, he will be able
to show that his advance was in fact used to acquire rights in the
computer. "
162. See pt. I(A)(1).
163. See J. White & R. Summers, supra note 22, § 25-5, at 1045. But see Rock-
land Credit Union, Inc. v. Gauthier Motors, Inc., 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 637 (Mass.
App. 1967) (an advance was apparently made to the debtor, but a purchase money
security interest under § 9-107(b) was still upheld). In Fedders Financial Corp. v.
Chiarelli Bros., 221 Pa. Super. 224, 229, 289 A.2d 169, 172 (1972), a financier
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The second group of incidental charges included the finance
charge, filing fees and various insurance premium charges that a cre-
dit buyer would incur to finance the purchase. In the case of seller-
buyer purchase money security interests, these charges were also in-
cluded under the section 9-107(a) definition of "price." The language
of section 9-107(b), however, makes it more difficult for the financier-
creditor to justify including these charges as part of purchase money
debt.' Because the problems are different with respect to the fi-
nance charge and filing fees and insurance premiums, each merits
separate discussion.
a. The Finance Charge
To include the finance charge as section 9-107(b) purchase money
debt, it must be justified first as an "advance" and then as an advance
"in fact used to acquire rights in collateral." As to whether the fi-
nance charge constitutes an "advance" by the financier, it must be
recognized that the financier does not directly pay the finance charge
to anyone on the buyer's behalf. He advances the seller the purchase
price of the equipment, thereby lending the buyer that amount of
money. The buyer must then repay the financier the principal
amount of the advance plus the finance or interest charge. Although
the word "advance" in section 9-107(b) appears to connote an advance
of money, it need not be interpreted so narrowly. The financier could
be viewed as having "advanced" the finance charge to the buyer, not
in the form of money, but rather in the form of a credit. Even if the
"advance" hurdle is surmounted, can this "credit advance" be viewed
as having in fact been used to acquire rights in collateral? It is hard
to fit the "credit advance" covering the finance charge within this
language because the "advance" covering the finance charge is not
directly involved in the buyer's acquisition of rights in equipment
from the seller.
Although the language of section 9-107(b) presents analytical diffi-
culties, it can still reasonably be interpreted to include the finance
charge in purchase money debt. Section 9-107(b) does not expressly
exclude the finance charge from purchase money debt. Although this
is a plausible inference from the "in fact so used" language of the
section, it is not the only plausible inference. The drafters of the
Code wished to limit purchase money debt to advances actually used
to acquire collateral, but they must have understood that the finan-
advanced the buyer money directly, but the court still found a § 9-107(b) purchase
money security interest to exist. There was, however, definite evidence in this case
that constructed a chain of evidence between the money advanced and the collateral
purchased.
164. See McLaughlin, supra note 161, at 233-35.
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cier's advance "so used" would be repaid with a finance charge added
to it. Thus, in emphasizing the nature of the purchase money ad-
vance, the drafters did not intend to imply that the finance charge
was to be treated differently from the underlying advance. Two other
sections of Article 9 lend support to this conclusion.
Section 9-107 deals with purchase money security interests, and
the very wording of the section indicates that this type of security
interest requires a "purchase." The Code defines a "purchase" in
Article 1 as a "taking by sale." In the context of Article 9, a sale
will always be a credit sale, and credit sale necessarily involves a
finance charge. A purchase money security interest should secure the
full amount needed for the credit sale; the finance charge, therefore,
should be included within the purchase money debt secured by the
collateral.
Section 9-507(1) provides for the computation of the statutory pen-
alty imposed on secured parties who violate their Article 9 obligations
toward consumer debtors. This penalty is computed by dividing the
secured debt into its cash and credit components and then adding
10% of the former to the entire amount of the latter.'6 The section
inferentially recognizes that a secured debt is always composed of
both cash and credit elements. There is no reason to assume that the
drafters intended a purchase money debt to exclude the credit
element. '"
b. Filing Fees and Insurance Premiums
In the typical situation, if the buyer does not pay the filing fees
and the required insurance premiums at the time the security in-
terest attaches to the collateral, the financier will pay these costs and
add them to the secured debt owed him by the buyer. In terms of
165. U.(G.C. § 1-201(32).
166. Id. § 9-507(1).
167. In Mechanicks Nat'l Bank v. Parker, 109 N.H. 87, 242 A.2d 69 (1968), a §
9-107(b) financier bank advanced $1,800 to a debtor to buy a car. The debtor then
gave the bank an installment note for $2,080.44-which obviously included finance
charges. The court ruled that the bank had a purchase money security interest in the
proceeds of the sale of the collateral to secure the remaining indebtedness-
presumably the amount left to be paid on the full $2,080.44. Id. at 88-89, 242 A.2d
at 70-71. In Union Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Marine, Inc., 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 563
(Pa. C.P. 1979), it is clear that the secured debt included finance charges as well as
the principal amount of the financier's loan. Although the court ultimately ruled that
the financier did not have an automatically perfected purchase money security in-
terest in consumer goods, the court did not suggest or even refer to the problem
because the finance charges were included in purhase money debt. The court found
that the collateral in question-a yacht-was not consumer goods, and thus, the




the language of section 9-107(b), the financier will have given value
by "making advances" on the buyer's behalf. This advance, however,
will not be made to the seller, but to the insurance company and the
filing officer. Section 9-107(b) also requires that the advance actually
be used to "acquire rights in collateral." It is difficult to fit advances
used to pay the costs of filing and insurance directly within the scope
of this language. The amounts advanced to pay these costs were used,
not "to acquire rights" in collateral, but to protect and preserve the
financier's rights in the collateral. To include these additional credit
charges in section 9-107(b) purchase money debt, an equipment
financier should rely on the Code's general principles and policies
embodied in section 1-102. There is no rational basis for treating
these incidental costs of credit differently from the finance charge.
They generally become part of the secured debt when the debtor
does not pay them directly." Common sense and general business
understanding argue for their inclusion in section 9-107(b) purchase
money debt. Thus, section 9-107(b) can be interpreted to include the
finance charge and insurance and filing costs in purchase money debt.
The policy behind purchase money priority and pre-Code law sup-
port including advances covering filing fees, insurance premiums and
the finance charge in section 9-107(b) purchase money debt as they
supported including these amounts in section 9-107(a) purchase
money debt. 69 Similarly, nothing in the Code indicates that the
drafters intended to treat the section 9-107(a) financing seller more
favorably than the section 9-107(b) financier with respect to these
costs. The inclusion of these costs in section 9-107(a) purchase money
debt, but not in section 9-107(b) purchase money debt, would have
that effect.
2. "Debt Add On" Clauses-Post Sale Expenses
Part I of this Article demonstrated that post sale expenses paid
either to preserve the value of the collateral or to collect the secured
debt are includable in purchase money debt even though not part of
the "price." This conclusion was based mainly on sections of the
Code other than section 9-107(a). With respect to post sale expenses
paid to preserve the value of the collateral, the analysis depended on
168. See the retail installment contract in L. Denonn, supra note 28, at 267-69. In
this retail installment contract, charges for insurance are made part of the principal
balance due from the debtor and thus one of the debtor's obligations, the payment of
which is secured by an interest in the collateral. The filing fees in this form contract
must be paid at the time of the execution of the agreement. Thus, they are not made
part of the outstanding obligations of the debtor, secured by the collateral. If not
paid by the debtor at the time of the signing of the security agreement, filing fees
would be added to the payment obligation still due from the debtor, the performance
of which would be secured by the collateral. Id.
169. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
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section 9-207."7' Section 9-207 could also justify the "add on" of such
post sale expenses to the purchase money advance under section 9-
107(b). It should be recognized, however, that the explicit "in fact so
used" language of section 9-107(b) might make judicial acceptance of
the suggested reasoning more speculative. With respect to post sale
expenses paid to collect the secured debt, the section 9-504 analysis
offered in Part I appears sufficiently compelling to warrant treating
amounts expended to collect the secured debt as part of purchase
money debt under section 9-107(b)."'
3. "Debt Add On" Clauses-Debt Unrelated
to the Equipment Sale
The explicit requirement of section 9-107(b) that a purchase money
advance actually be used to acquire rights in collateral bars including
debt unrelated to the equipment sale as part of purchase money
debt. Thus, if financier F advanced $10,000 to S to cover the pur-
chase of a computer by B and then advanced B and extra $5,000 to
prepare his plant to receive the computer, securing both advances
with the equipment purchased, F would have a purchase money
security interest in the computer to secure his $10,000 advance, but
only an ordinary security interest in the computer to secure the
$5,000 advance."' This result assumes, of course, that a court would
accept the "to the extent" preamble of section 9-107 and permit divi-
sion of the debt into its purchase money and non-purchase money
components. If a court were not so disposed, the addition of the non-
purchase money debt might destroy the purchase money transaction
in toto.
Financier-creditor F, however, might attempt to justify including
the $5,000 advance in purchase money debt by arguing that section
9-107(b) permits purchase money debt to encompass amounts spent
to enable the debtor to acquire rights in collateral, as well as amounts
actually used to acquire rights in collateral. The financier would argue
that the antecedent of "in fact so used" in section 9-107(b) is the
phrase " 'to enable' the debtor to acquire rights in . . . collateral"
rather than "to acquire rights in collateral." 1"3 Thus, if an advance is
used to enable B to purchase the computer, it can be treated as
170. See notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text.
171. See notes 65-68 supra and accompanying text.
172. In Meyer v. General Am. Corp., 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 525 (Utah 1977), a
financier loaned debtor $12,000 "for the purpose of providing operating capital for
their mining operation and to purchase [equipment]." Id. at 526. Although dictum,
the Utah Supreme Court found that the financier had a purchase money security
interest in the equipment to secure the full $12,000. Id. at 531. The court, however,
did not divide the debt into its two components. The opinion seems wrong in this
regard.
173. See McLaughlin, supra note 161, at 227-28.
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purchase money debt. The $5,000 advance was "so used"; it enabled
B to prepare his plant to receive the computer, and wvithout this pre-
paration, there would have been no purchase. If accepted, this line of
reasoning could justify almost any advance to the debtor as a pur-
chase money advance. For example, an advance to cover the debtor's
general expenses could be causally linked to the equipment purchase.
Without the advance, the debtor would be required to use his own
funds to pay the expenses and, as a result, would be less able to buy
the equipment. The scope of section 9-107(b) is not so sweeping. Un-
less the advance is used directly to acquire rights in the equipment,
it cannot be justified as a purchase money advance.
4. "Debt Add On" Clauses-Subsequent Renewals
or Refinancings of the Purchase
Money Debt
The peculiarities of language in section 9-107(b) can create "add
on" problems for an equipment financier who amends a security
agreement to lengthen the original schedule of repayments. As was
previously demonstrated, the resultant increase in the finance charge
should not create "add on" problems for the section 9-107(a) purchase
money seller.7 7 The same cannot be said for the section 9-107(b)
purchase money financier, however.
To constitute purchase money debt under section 9-107(b), any in-
crease in the finance charge must both enable the debtor to acquire
rights in collateral and in fact be used to acquire those rights in col-
lateral. A degree of ingenuity is required to justify the increase in the
finance charge as an enabling advance. Obviously, the debtor ac-
quired rights in the collateral prior to the increase in the finance
charge. The language of section 9-107(b), however, appears to be
directed at the character of the underlying advance, rather than at
the character of the attendant credit charges. The section requires
that the principal amount of the underlying advance enable the
debtor to acquire rights in collateral. Once the underlying advance
meets this test, any credit charges required by the financier should
also be treated as purchase money debt. ' 5 Similarly, because the
increase in the finance charge is treated as part of the purchase
money "price" of an item, it would be illogical to include it in pur-
chase money debt for the purposes of section 9-107(a), but not for the
purpose of section 9-107(b).
An argument is also available to counter the "in fact so used"
objection. If the original finance charge can be included as part of
174. See notes 97-103 supra and accompanying text.
175. Professor Gilmore has argued for a more flexible definition of the enabling
requirement that might permit even post sale loans by the financier to meet this
requirement. See 2 G. Gilmore, supra note 42, § 29.2, at 782.
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purchase money debt despite the "in fact so used" language,1lo then
any subsequent increase in the finance charge should receive similar
purchase money treatment. The increase in the finance charge re-
mains linked to the underlying purchase money advance.
B. "Collateral Add On" and
"Debt Collateral Add On" Clauses
As to "collateral add on" -- and "debt collateral add on" ',, clauses
the conclusions reached with respect to the equipment seller under
section 9-107(a) remain valid for the equipment financier under sec-
tion 9-107(b). To the extent that the language of section 9-107(b) com-
plicates the analysis of purchase money debt, however, it will also
complicate the analysis of "debt collateral add on" clauses.
CONCLUSION
An analysis of the effect of "add on" clauses on the purchase money
priority rights of equipment sellers and financiers is facilitated by di-
viding these clauses into three categories: "debt add on" clauses,
"collateral add on" clauses, and "debt collateral add on" clauses.
Without affecting purchase money priority the Code permits debt to
be added to the price of the equipment sold if the debt is sales re-
lated or incurred either to preserve the value of the collateral or to
collect the secured debt. Debt totally unrelated to the sale transac-
tion cannot be permissibly added to the price without affecting
purchase money rights. In these cases, however, the Code may per-
mit the secured debt to be divided into its purchase money and non-
purchase money components. With respect to "collateral add on"
clauses, the Code permits the addition of "proceeds" as extra pur-
chase money collateral, but precludes the addition of "accessions,"
"additions," or collateral already owned by the debtor. "Debt col-
lateral add on" clauses are impermissible, although a defensible argu-
ment can be advanced that these clauses should not result in a total
loss of purchase money priority. Equipment lenders, however, should
only use these "debt collateral add on" clauses with great caution.
The reason for the caution is clear. The salvage of even partial pur-
chase money status requires a court to perform a rather intricate divi-
sion of the secured debt into its two components; some courts may
refuse to do this. Moreover, the equipment lender can achieve most
advantages of the "debt collateral add on" clause by less dangerous
means.
176. See note 169 supra and accompanying text.
177. See pt. I(B) supra.
178. See pt. I(C) supra.
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The importance of the meticulous analysis of "add on" clauses can-
not be overemphasized. An equipment lender who ignores the diffi-
culties caused by "add on" clauses may find himself stripped of
purchase money priority. In an effort to gain a little extra advantage,
he may discover, much to his chagrin, that he has sacrificed his pri-
mary advantage-namely, purchase money priority. In this case, too
much of a good thing can result in nothing at all.
